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  Summary / Résumé / Resumen 
 
Summary 
Historically, most relationships between the private sector and civil society have 
been founded upon conflict. In different sectors and geographical contexts, this 
pattern of business-NGO relations has recently started to change with the 
emergence of formal sustainable development partnerships between these long-
standing adversaries. 
  
Part 1 of this paper offers a global overview of the changing nature of business-
NGO relations on sustainable development. It examines why and how such 
relations are changing in the 1990s, the current spectrum of business-NGO 
relations and how the strategic responses of business and NGOs to sustainable 
development have evolved. In order to illustrate how business-NGO relations in 
both the North and South are developing in practice, three case studies are 
presented on protest and partnership initiatives in the forest products, oil and 
sporting goods industries respectively.  
 
The case study of the tropical timber trade highlights the myriad relations between 
civil society and business and the very different corporate responses to civil 
society and consumer pressures. It is suggested that these varied responses are 
partly explained by the fact that certain companies and individuals within senior 
management have taken a leadership role and have recognized both the ethical, 
commercial or competitive value of corporate environmental responsibility. 
 
The analysis of Shells experience in Nigeria reveals the impact which co-
ordinated global protest can have on corporate activities. This case suggests that 
enhanced dialogue and partnership may not be enough to improve the global image 
of the oil industry. The big oil companies confront serious limits in their ability to 
change fundamentally the environmentally damaging nature of their business and, 
in general, have failed to recognize the need for energy alternatives.  
 
The case study of the attempt to eliminate the use of child labour in the 
manufacture of soccer balls in Pakistan outlines the politics and processes of 
complex multi-stakeholder North-South partnerships to promote corporate social 
responsibility. An important lesson from this case is the fundamental importance 
of corporate transparency and a willingness to accept independent monitoring. The 
study reveals the tensions inherent in such projects. Serious questions remain 
concerning the future of children whose employment is affected, the effects of 
such projects on exports, and the sustainability and replicability of complex multi-
stakeholder projects. 
 
The case studies are followed by a review of various typologies of business-NGO 
relations in the literature on conflict and partnership. None, it is argued, explains 
adequately the diversity of such relations and their implications for governance 
and global social change. Part 1 concludes with preliminary thoughts on the 
preconditions, interactive processes and outcomes of more collaborative relations 
between business and NGOs. 
 
Part 2 presents a theory to explain the expanding role of NGOs in the promotion of 
corporate responsibility for sustainable development. It considers the potential for 
the wider replication of NGO-driven corporate environmentalism in developing 
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 countries. This is done by placing the initiatives described in Part 1 within the 
context of global processes, including the globalization of business, trade and 
finance, advances in communications technologies and new governance 
challenges. This leads to the development of a theory of how corporations are 
regulated for social and environmental goals in a globalizing economy.  
 
It is argued that growing business responsibility for the environment is not only a 
rational business response to so-called win-win opportunities. Neither is it 
simply a public relations exercise, as some critics contend. Rather, companies are 
responding to various forms of pressure and influence from civil society 
organizations and movements. In other words, what is referred to in this paper as 
civil regulation is an increasingly important driver of corporate environmental and 
social responsibility. 
 
Key points to emerge from this analysis include the following:  
 
 Corporate environmentalism is a political phenomenon. 
 Through the politics of both pressure and engagement, NGOs are creating the 
new agenda for business as much as companies are themselves. 
 The political power of NGOs is not a passing fad but an expression of a new 
form of consumer politics, which is the result of social, economic and cultural 
change. 
 By describing a continuum of protest and partnership relations between 
business and NGOs we can observe a new form of regulation for global 
business, called civil regulation. 
 Civil regulation organizations, such as the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) 
and Marine Stewardship Council (MSC), will probably be replicated in other 
industrial sectors and come to be known as systems of global private regulation. 
 These developments rely on the sensitivities of Northern markets, and may not 
be transferable to countries or regions where consumer-driven market pressure 
is not as prevalent. 
 For the civil regulation agenda to develop in the South, and for Northern NGOs 
to maintain legitimacy when promoting corporate responsibility in developing 
countries, there must be stronger alliances between Northern and Southern 
NGOs. 
 Changes in the global economy mean that governments need to assume a 
greater role as leaders and facilitators, but they are in danger of negotiating that 
role away through global trade and investment agreements. 
 The uncertainty that surrounds the issue of corporate environmentalism 
suggests the need for greater international collaboration in this area. 
 
David Murphy is a Senior Researcher at the New Academy of Business, 
specializing in the fields of sustainable development and corporate social 
responsibility. Jem Bendell is co-ordinator of The Values Network, an 
organization which brings together business, NGOs and researchers to discuss 
standards and certification for responsible business practice, and currently a 
doctoral candidate at the University of Bristol. 
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 Résumé 
 
Historiquement, la plupart des relations entre le secteur privé et la société civile 
sont conflictuelles. Dans différents secteurs et contextes géographiques, ce type de 
relations entreprises-ONG a commencé à changer récemment avec lémergence de 
partenariats officiels de développement durable entre ces protagonistes longtemps 
adversaires.  
 
La première partie de ce document donne une vue densemble du changement qui 
est en train de sopérer dans les relations entre entreprises et ONG sur le 
développement durable. Les auteurs étudient pourquoi et comment ces relations se 
transforment dans les années 1990, examinent le spectre actuel des relations 
entreprises-ONG et sinterrogent sur la manière dont a évolué lattitude stratégique 
des entreprises et des ONG à légard du développement durable. Pour illustrer 
comment les relations entreprises-ONG ont évolué au Nord et au Sud, ils 
présentent trois études de cas, consacrées à des initiatives de contestation et de 
partenariat dans les domaines des produits forestiers, du pétrole et des articles de 
sport respectivement. 
 
Létude du commerce des bois tropicaux met en lumière la myriade des relations 
entre la société civile et les entreprises et les réactions extrêmement différentes de 
ces dernières aux pressions de la société civile et des consommateurs. Selon les 
auteurs, la diversité de ces réactions sexpliquerait en partie par le fait que 
certaines sociétés et certains cadres supérieurs ont compris avant les autres la 
valeur éthique et lintérêt commercial ou compétitif dun comportement 
écologiquement responsable.  
 
Lanalyse de lexpérience de Shell au Nigéria révèle limpact que peut avoir une 
contestation mondiale concertée sur les activités dune entreprise. Ce cas laisse à 
penser quune plus grande ouverture au dialogue et au partenariat peut ne pas 
suffire à améliorer limage de marque de lindustrie pétrolière dans le monde. 
Laptitude des grandes sociétés pétrolières à changer radicalement la nature 
polluante de leurs activités est très limitée et, de manière générale, elles refusent 
de reconnaître la nécessité dénergies de substitution. 
 
Létude sur la tentative délimination du travail des enfants dans la confection des 
ballons de football au Pakistan fait ressortir les aspects politiques dassociations 
complexes formées entre des protagonistes multiples du Nord et du Sud pour 
inciter des entreprises à assumer leurs responsabilités sociales, ainsi que les aléas 
de telles relations. Sil est un enseignement à tirer de cette étude, cest bien 
limportance fondamentale de la transparence pour les entreprises et la nécessité 
pour elles daccepter le contrôle dun organisme indépendant. Létude révèle les 
tensions inhérentes à ce genre de projets. De graves questions demeurent en 
suspens: lavenir des enfants dont lemploi est touché, les effets de ces projets sur 
les exportations et la viabilité et la reproductibilité de projets complexes réunissant 
de nombreux participants.  
 
Les études de cas sont suivies dune analyse des divers types de relations 
entreprises-ONG décrits dans la littérature du conflit et du partenariat. Selon les 
auteurs, aucun de ces types ne suffit à expliquer la diversité de ces relations et 
leurs incidences sur la gestion des affaires et le changement social à léchelle 
mondiale. La première partie sachève sur des réflexions préliminaires sur les 
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 conditions et les effets dune attitude plus coopérative entre entreprises et ONG et 
sur les facteurs intervenant dans leurs relations.  
 
La deuxième partie expose une théorie destinée à expliquer la part de plus en plus 
grande que prennent les ONG à laction menée pour inciter les entreprises à 
assumer leurs responsabilités en matière de développement durable. Les auteurs 
examinent les possibilités qui soffrent de voir les ONG pousser les entreprises à 
se montrer plus respectueuses de lenvironnement dans les pays en développement. 
Ils le font en replaçant les initiatives décrites dans la première partie dans le 
contexte des grands courants mondiaux, notamment celui de la mondialisation des 
affaires, du commerce et des finances, des progrès des techniques de 
communication et des nouveaux défis lancés aux dirigeants. Cela les amène à 
élaborer une théorie sur la manière dont les sociétés se régulent en fonction 
dobjectifs sociaux et écologiques dans une économie en voie de mondialisation.  
 
Les auteurs expliquent quen adoptant un comportement écologiquement plus 
responsable les entreprises nagissent pas seulement de manière rationnelle dans 
une situation où toutes les parties en présence ont à gagner. Elles ne se livrent pas 
non plus simplement à un exercice de relations publiques, comme laffirment 
certains détracteurs. Ce serait plutôt leur façon de réagir à diverses pressions et 
influences exercées par des mouvements et des organisations de la société civile. 
En dautres termes, ce quon appelle dans ce document la régulation civile est 
une incitation de plus en plus puissante à adopter un comportement 
écologiquement et socialement responsable.  
 
Voici les principales conclusions qui se dégagent de cette analyse:  
 
 Le souci de lenvironnement dans les entreprises est un phénomène politique. 
 En alliant pressions et engagement, les ONG infléchissent le comportement des 
entreprises autant que celles-ci le déterminent elles-mêmes.  
 Le pouvoir politique des ONG nest pas une mode passagère mais la 
manifestion de la force nouvelle que représentent les consommateurs et qui 
résulte de changements sociaux, économiques et culturels. 
 En décrivant tout le spectre des relations entre entreprises et ONGqui va de 
la contestation au partenariaton peut observer une nouvelle forme de 
régulation à laquelle se soumet le monde des entreprises, appelée régulation 
civile. 
 Des organisations telles que le Forest Stewardship Council (FSCConseil 
pour lintendance des forêts) et le Marine Stewardship Council (MSCConseil 
pour lintendance du milieu marin) qui se font linstrument de la régulation 
civile seront sans doute prises comme modèle dans dautres branches dactivité 
et reconnues comme des systèmes mondiaux de régulation privée. 
 Ce type dévolution dépend des sensibilités des marchés du Nord et nest pas 
forcément exportable dans les pays ou régions où les consommateurs nont pas 
autant de poids sur le marché.  
 Si lon veut quune réglementation civile se mette en place au Sud autour de 
mots dordre donnés et que les ONG du Nord gardent leur légitimité 
lorsquelles engagent des entreprises à assumer leurs responsabilités dans les 
pays en développement, ONG du Nord et du Sud doivent conclure des alliances 
plus solides.  
 Avec les changements qui sopèrent dans léconomie mondiale, les 
gouvernements devraient semployer davantage à donner des impulsions et à 
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 créer des conditions favorables. Or, ils risquent de brader ce rôle en signant des 
accords mondiaux sur le commerce et les investissements. 
 Lincertitude qui subsiste quant à la réalité du souci de lenvironnement dans 
les entreprises porte à conclure à la nécessité dune plus forte collaboration 
internationale. 
 
David Murphy est chercheur principal à la New Academy of Business, specialisé 
dans les domaines du développement durable et de la responsabilité sociale des 
entreprises. Jem Bendell est coordinateur de The Values Network, une 
organisation réunissant les mondes des affaires, des ONG et des chercheurs afin de 
débattre des normes et certificats dans la pratique responsable des affaires. Il est 
également candidat au doctorat à lUniversité de Bristol. 
 
Resumen 
 
Históricamente, la mayoría de las relaciones que se han establecido entre el sector 
privado y la sociedad civil han sido sobre una base conflictiva. En los últimos 
tiempos y en diferentes sectores y contextos geográficos, este patrón que se ha 
dado en las relaciones entre las empresas y las ONG ha comenzado a cambiar con 
el surgimiento de las asociaciones formales en función del desarrollo sostenible 
entre estos inveterados adversarios. 
 
La primera parte de este documento ofrece un panorama global de la naturaleza 
cambiante de las relaciones que se han entablado entre las empresas y las ONG 
con respecto al desarrollo sostenible. Examina el porqué y cómo se han ido 
transformando estas relaciones en el transcurso de los años 90, el espectro actual 
de las relaciones empresariado-ONG y cómo han evolucionado las respuestas 
estratégicas empresariales y de las ONG con respecto al desarrollo sostenible. Con 
el fin de ilustrar la forma en que las relaciones empresariado-ONG se han 
desarrollado en la práctica en los países del Norte y del Sur, se presentan tres 
estudios de caso sobre iniciativas de protesta y de asociación que han tenido lugar 
en las industrias de productos forestales, petrolera y de artículos deportivos 
respectivamente. 
 
El estudio de caso sobre el comercio de maderas tropicales destaca la miríada de 
tipos de relaciones que se han dado entre la sociedad civil y el sector empresarial, 
y las respuestas tan diferentes que han ofrecido las corporaciones a las presiones 
ejercidas por la sociedad civil y los consumidores. Se esboza que tal variedad de 
respuestas se explica en parte por el hecho de que tanto ciertas empresas como 
individuos en cargos directivos han adoptado un papel pautador, asimismo que han 
reconocido el valor ético, comercial o competitivo del sentido de responsabilidad 
empresarial en torno al medio ambiente. 
 
El análisis de la experiencia de Shell en Nigeria revela los efectos que puede tener 
la protesta mundial coordinada sobre las actividades empresariales. Este caso 
sugiere que el mejoramiento que se ha producido en el diálogo y en la asociación 
tal vez no sea suficiente para sanear la imagen global de la industria petrolera. 
Las grandes compañías petroleras confrontan serios límites en su habilidad para 
cambiar fundamentalmente la naturaleza perjudicial al medio ambiente de su 
actividad comercial y, en general, no han logrado reconocer la necesidad de otras 
alternativas de energía. 
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 El estudio de caso del intento de eliminar el uso de la mano de obra infantil en la 
manufactura de pelotas de fútbol en Pakistán, perfila las políticas y los procesos de 
las asociaciones complejas de múltiples partes interesadas de los países del Norte y 
del Sur en la promoción de la responsabilidad empresarial en el entorno social. 
Una lección de peso que se desprende de este caso es la importancia fundamental 
de transparencia empresarial y la voluntad de aceptar un seguimiento 
independiente. Este estudio revela las tensiones inherentes en tales proyectos. Aún 
quedan cuestiones serias por tratar concernientes al futuro de los niños cuyos 
empleos se ven afectados, las repercusiones de tales proyectos sobre las 
exportaciones, y la sostenibilidad y la posibilidad de reproducir los complejos 
proyectos de múltiples partes interesadas. 
 
Los estudios de caso van seguidos de un examen de varias tipologías de relaciones 
empresariado-ONG en la literatura sobre conflictos y asociaciones. Se arguye que 
ninguna documentación explica adecuadamente la diversidad de tales relaciones y 
sus implicaciones en la gestión y el cambio social global. La primera parte 
concluye con pensamientos preliminares sobre las condiciones previas, los 
procesos interactivos y los resultados de relaciones con mayor colaboración entre 
el empresariado y las ONG. 
 
La segunda parte plantea una teoría explicativa de la creciente función que 
desempeñan las ONG en la promoción de la responsabilidad empresarial para el 
desarrollo sostenible. Considera el potencial para una más amplia reproducción de 
las actividades empresariales en favor del medio ambiente conducidas por las 
ONG en los países en desarrollo. Para lograrlo se sitúan las iniciativas descritas en 
la primera parte del documento dentro del contexto de los procesos mundiales, 
incluyendo la globalización empresarial o industrial, el comercio y las finanzas, los 
avances en las tecnologías de la comunicación y los nuevos retos que presenta la 
gestión. Esto encamina a concebir una teoría sobre cómo se reglamentan las 
empresas para alcanzar las metas sociales y ambientales en una economía que se 
está globalizando. 
 
Se arguye que la creciente responsabilidad empresarial para enfrentar el deterioro 
del medio ambiente no es solamente una respuesta empresarial racional ante las 
oportunidades que ofrecen igual ventaja. Como tampoco es un ejercicio de 
relaciones públicas según lo afirman algunos críticos. Más bien, las empresas están 
respondiendo a las varias formas de presión e influencia ejercida por las 
organizaciones y movimientos de sociedad civil. En otras palabras, lo que se 
refiere en este documento como reglamento civil es un mecanismo de engranaje 
cada vez más importante de la responsabilidad de las empresas corporativas en 
torno al medio ambiente y a los efectos sociales. 
 
Los puntos claves que surgen de este análisis abarcan lo siguiente: 
 
 Las actividades empresariales para la protección del medio ambiente 
constituyen un fenómeno político. 
 Mediante políticas de presión y compromiso, las ONG están creando una nueva 
agenda para las empresas corporativas, la cual tiene igual importancia que la 
agenda que crean las mismas empresas. 
 El poder político de las ONG no es una tendencia pasajera, sino más bien la 
expresión de una nueva forma de políticas del consumidor como consecuencia 
del cambio social, económico y cultural. 
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  Al describir un continuum de relaciones de protesta y de asociación entabladas 
entre el empresariado y las ONG, podemos observar una nueva forma de 
reglamentación para las actividades mundiales de las empresas corporativas, 
denominada reglamentación civil. 
 Las organizaciones de reglamentación civil como el Consejo de Administración 
Forestal (FSC) y el Consejo de Administración Marina (MSC) probablemente 
se replicarán en otros sectores industriales y se llegarán a conocer como 
sistemas de reglamentación mundial privada. 
 Estos acontecimientos descansan en la sensibilidad de los mercados de los 
países del Norte, y no pueden transferirse a los países o regiones donde la 
presión de los mercados ejercida por el consumidor no es tan frecuente. 
 Para que la agenda de reglamentación civil se impulse en el Sur, y para que las 
ONG del Norte se mantengan legítimas cuando promueven la responsabilidad 
empresarial en los países menos desarrollados, tendrán que haber alianzas más 
fuertes entre las ONG del Norte y del Sur. 
 Los cambios en la economía mundial urgen a los gobiernos a que amplíen su 
papel de líderes y facilitadores, pero corren el peligro de traspasar ese papel a 
través del comercio mundial y los acuerdos de inversión. 
 La incertidumbre que existe en torno a las actividades empresariales para la 
protección del medio ambiente indica que necesitamos mucho más 
colaboración internacional al respecto. 
 
David Murphy es investigador titular en la New Academy of Business. Se ha 
especializado en los campos de desarrollo sostenible y de la responsabilidad social 
de las corporaciones. Jem Bendell es coordinador de The Values Network, una 
organización que reúne al mundo de los negocios, a las ONGs y a los 
investigadores para discutir las normas y la certificación para las prácticas 
responsables de los negocios. Actualmente es candidato para el doctorado en la 
Universidad de Bristol. 
xi 
  Abbreviations and Acronyms 
 
AFL-CIO American Federation of Labour 
ASSEFA Association of Sarva Seva Farms (India) 
BCSD Business Council for Sustainable Development 
BGMEA Bangladesh Garments Manufacturers and Exporters 
Association 
BLCC Bunyad Literacy Community Council 
CAB Central African Batteries 
CACP Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection (Republic of 
Korea) 
CONCAWE Conservation of Clean Air and Water Western Europe 
DIY do-it-yourself 
EDF Environmental Defense Fund 
EHS environment, health and safety 
ENGO environmental NGO 
FDI foreign direct investment 
FIFA Fédération Internationale de Football Association 
FoE Friends of the Earth 
FSC Forest Stewardship Council 
GEMI Global Environmental Management Initiative 
ICC International Chamber of Commerce 
ILO International Labour Organization 
ILRF International Labor Rights Fund 
IOC International Olympic Committee 
IPEC International Programme for the Elimination of Child Labour 
IRRC Investor Responsibility Research Centre 
ITTA International Tropical Timber Agreement 
ITTO International Tropical Timber Organisation 
MAI Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
MEB Management Institute for Environment and Business 
MOSOP Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People 
MSC Marine Stewardship Council 
NGO non-governmental organization 
NNPC Nigerian National Petroleum Company 
ODA official development assistance 
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OIA Environmental Institute (Brazil) 
ORAP Organisation of Rural Associations for Progress (Zimbabwe) 
PBM Pakistan Bait-ul-Mal 
PR public relations 
RAG Rainforest Action Group 
RED Red Ambiental Peruana 
SCCI Sialkot Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
SCF Save the Children-UK 
TNC transnational corporation 
UK United Kingdom 
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme 
UNICEF United Nations Childrens Fund 
UNPO Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation 
UNRISD United Nations Research Institute for Social Development 
WBCSD World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
xii 
 WCC World Council of Churches 
WFSGI World Federation of the Sporting Goods Industry 
WIC World Industry Council for Environment 
WWF World Wide Fund for Nature 
 
xiii 

 INTRODUCTION 
 
Partnership is not the first word that comes to mind when one thinks about 
business-NGO relations. Over the past three decades, most relationships between 
the private sector and civil society have been founded upon conflict.1 In different 
sectors and geographical contexts, this pattern of business-NGO relations started 
to change in the early 1990s with the emergence of formal sustainable 
development partnerships between these long-standing adversaries. Although most 
of these business-NGO partnerships to date have appeared in the North, many have 
significant implications for the Southparticularly those that promote 
international business and trading standards. Furthermore, there is some indication 
that Southern-based companies and NGOs are beginning to collaborate, albeit to a 
much lesser extent than their Northern counterparts. 
 
This paper is divided into two parts. part 1 offers a global overview of the 
changing nature of business-NGO relations on sustainable development. Our 
purpose here is to examine why and how business-NGO relations are changing in 
the 1990s. We summarize the current spectrum of business-NGO relations and 
consider how the strategic responses of business and NGOs to sustainable 
development have evolved over the years. In order to illustrate how business-NGO 
relations in both the North and South are developing in practice, three case studies 
are presented on protest and partnership initiatives in the forest products, oil and 
sporting goods industries. This is followed by review of various theoretical 
perspectives on business-NGO relations from a broad literature on conflict and 
partnership. Given that this is an emerging area of study, part 1 of the paper 
concludes with preliminary thoughts on the preconditions, processes and outcomes 
of more collaborative relations between business and NGOs. 
 
Part 2 presents a theory to explain the expanding role of NGOs in the 
promotion of corporate responsibility for sustainable development. We 
consider the potential for the wider replication of NGO-driven corporate 
environmentalism in developing countries. This is done by placing the 
initiatives described above within the context of global processes, including 
the globalization of business, trade and finance, advances in 
communications technologies and new governance challenges. This leads us 
to develop a theory of how corporations are regulated for social and 
environmental goals in a globalizing economy. We call this civil regulation.  
                                                     
1 Alongside business-NGO confrontation, various NGOs have accepted corporate donations 
for specific projects or causes. While some writers have characterized these activities as 
partnerships (Forrester, 1990; Waddock, 1988), others have tended to view them 
primarily as corporate sponsorship agreements (Murphy and Bendell, 1997). Recent 
research suggests that greater attention is being given to the mutual benefits for business and 
NGOs of these agreements (Waddell, 1998). 
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PART 1: THE CHANGING NATURE 
OF BUSINESS-NGO RELATIONS 
 
CONFLICT AND COLLABORATION 
 
The road to partnership often begins with and depends upon conflict. Back in 
1962, Rachel Carsons Silent Spring launched the contemporary Northern 
environmental movement with an exposé on the harmful effects of pesticides upon 
people and their natural environments. The chemical industry responded with a 
scathing attack on environmentalists, branding them a motley lot ranging from 
superstitious illiterates and cultists to educated scientists (quoted in Hoffman, 
1996:53). Thirty years later in the lead-up to the 1992 Earth Summit, Stephan 
Schmidheinys Changing Course was intended as a clarion call for global 
business to see environmental pressures as new business opportunities. Changing 
Course launched the Business Council for Sustainable Development (BCSD) and 
offered 38 case studies of best environmental practice, including chemical 
producers Ciba-Geigy, Dow, DuPont and Shell. Greenpeace responded with a pre-
emptive attack on Changing Course hours before its official launch in May 1992. 
And weeks later at the Earth Summit, the NGO released The Greenpeace Book of 
Greenwash (Bruno, 1992), which castigated nine of the BCSD companies for 
their poor environmental records. From Silent Spring to Changing Course, 
relations between representatives of business and the NGO movement have for the 
most part remained strongly antagonistic. The mid-1995 confrontation between 
Shell and Greenpeace over the disposal of the Brent Spar offshore oil installation 
confirmed the long-standing image of two tribes engaged in perpetual war over 
values, words and ideas. 
 
There is another side to the business-NGO story. While the dominant pattern of 
business-NGO relations remains antagonistic, in recent years some businesses and 
NGOs have been quietly working together to overcome their differences. In many 
cases, NGO protest and other forms of campaigning have forced business to the 
negotiating table. For example, the high-profile Greenpeace-Shell confrontation 
eventually led Shell-UK to engage the Environment Council, a British NGO, to 
facilitate a series of European-wide Dialogue Forums between the company and 
a wide range of NGOs and other stakeholders on alternative disposal options for 
the Brent Spar. In late 1996, Shell-UKs Fay said that his company had no option 
but to pursue the goal of sustainable development (quoted in Cowe, 1996:17). 
 
Recent stories from the South also reveal both collaboration and conflict between 
business and NGOs. Although relatively few in number, Southern business-NGO 
partnerships are beginning to emerge. In Zimbabwe, the development NGO 
Organisation of Rural Associations for Progress (ORAP) and Central African 
Batteries (CAB) have been working together since 1992. The ORAP-CAB 
partnership is a formal joint venture that creates small businesses to sell or lease 
batteries to households and to develop solar-powered recharging centres. This 
helps to promote a more regular and sustainable energy source for local lighting 
(UNEP/PWBLF, 1994). 
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A different example of business-NGO collaboration comes from Brazil, where the 
Environmental Institute (OIA) has facilitated co-operation between NGOs, local 
authorities, community associations and various companies on the Biomass 
Nutrient Recycling Project. One outcome of this project was the development of 
the Petropolis Waste Water Treatment Plant as a commercial venture of OIA 
(INEM, 1996). Another example comes from Asia, where an NGO, Citizens 
Alliance for Consumer Protection (CACP), in the Republic of Korea organizes 
high-profile media events aimed at getting large corporations to sign agreements 
related to cleaner production, energy efficiency and other environmental matters.  
 
Quite a different story emerges from many other parts of the South, where 
business-NGO confrontation remains the order of the day. For example, in early 
1997 the proposed Essa sea-salt plant joint venture between the Mitsubishi 
corporation and the Mexican government came under attack by a coalition of 
Mexican and American NGOs and activists. The campaign raised concerns about 
the plants potential impact on grey whale habitats in the San Ignacio lagoon. 
Indeed, throughout the South many NGOs continue to gather information about 
planned or actual development projects, making data available to local and 
indigenous groups and NGOs in other countries. Related strategies include 
organizing corporate boycotts and promoting fair trade alternatives (Kiefer and 
Benjamin, 1993:231). 
 
To date, there appears to be greater evidence of business-NGO partnerships in the 
North than in the South. Whereas there has been a long history of business-NGO 
relations and consumer politics in the North, most NGOs in the South initially 
allied themselves with popular movements to oppose the state, while for all 
practical purposes, ignoring the market and its institutions (de Oliveira and 
Tandon, 1994:7). In the face of globalization and state deregulation, however, 
Southern NGOs are beginning to recognize the need to influence more directly, 
and in some cases collaborate with, business. 
 
While many within the global NGO movement continue to view any form of 
business-NGO collaboration with deep suspicion, others see improved relations 
with the private sector as a necessary tactic in trying to change unsustainable and 
unjust business behaviour. Some suggest that NGOs can have it both ways: 
 
[T]he exploration of opportunities for co-operative action does not imply 
that citizens [and NGOs] should renounce their right and duty to question 
and oppose corporationsand stateswhenever their behavior proves 
detrimental to the common good. In any case, labor disputes and conflicts 
over environmental or consumer issues will hardly disappear from the 
agenda of civil society (de Oliveira and Tandon, 1994:7). 
 
The apparent paradox of NGOs seeking both protest- and partnership-based 
relationships with business reflects a need for a new way of thinking about our 
problems and our futures (Handy, 1994:11). The management of paradox, Handy 
suggests, is about living with contradictions, not necessarily solving them. 
Managing paradox is also about mitigating the worst aspects, enjoying the best and 
using the experience to find clues to the way forward (Handy, 1994:13).  
 
In the following section, we examine a range of business responses to sustainable 
development, from a limited focus on pollution prevention to preliminary efforts 
by some companies to embrace a broader sustainability agenda. 
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BUSINESS RESPONSES TO 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
 
Within a broad spectrum of action and inaction, many businesses remain reactive 
and defensive about their environmental and social impacts and responsibilities. 
Most companies worldwide have hardly begun to respond seriously to the many 
challenges implied in the concept of sustainable development. A number of 
individual companies, industry sectors and informal business alliances are, 
nevertheless, slowly beginning to redress this situation. 
 
Despite mixed reviews at the time, the Rio Summit proved to be a watershed in the 
business response to sustainable development. While disagreements remain over 
what the concept really means, both theoretically and practically, there is general 
acceptance that sustainable development challenges us to understand and act upon 
ecological, social, economic and political issues in an integrated manner (Aina and 
Salau, 1992). The emergence of sustainable development as a new policy idea 
offered business an opportunity to enter the environmental debate as a legitimate 
participant. As noted earlier, many NGOs dismissed initiatives such as the BCSDs 
Changing Course. Despite its limitations, this initiative represented a major break 
with the past, when most businesses had at best ignored environmental issues, or 
done the legal minimum, and at worst had actively attempted to undermine 
environmental arguments.  
 
This is not to say that there were no relevant corporate responses to environmental 
issues before Rio. The first stage of a constructive business response began in the 
1970s, when a number of leading companies in North America and Western 
Europe initiated programmes aimed at reducing or preventing industrial pollution. 
The second stage of business response to environmental problems came in the 
wake of a number of high profile environmental disasters, including the Union 
Carbide chemical release in Bhopal, India (1984) and the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 
Prince William Sound, Alaska (1989). Consequently there was a proliferation of 
voluntary codes of conduct and above-compliance initiatives from industry. For 
example, in the mid-1980s the Canadian Chemical Producers Association 
introduced Responsible Care, and in 1990 the American Petroleum Institute 
launched its Environmental Mission and Guiding Principles. By establishing these 
and many other schemes, industry wanted to prove to its critics that it was capable 
of developing common standards and expertise in environmental management 
(UNCTAD, 1996). 
 
The second stage, or self-compliance agenda, remains the dominant paradigm of 
environmental management. Some argue that it is promoting sustainable 
development by allowing flexibility in addressing environmental issues and by 
creating incentives for environmental innovations (WBCSD, 1997). However, self-
compliance has been criticized by both environmentalists and academics for not 
going far enough and for being used by industry as a means of discouraging new 
environmental legislation or threatening to replace existing regulations (Welford, 
1997; FoE-UK, 1995).  
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In our book In the Company of Partners, we argue that the business response to 
sustainable development needs to move to a more ambitious third stage: 
 
If we are serious about meeting the needs of the present without 
compromising [those of] the future, we believe that . . . business must 
work together with other sectors to build a radically new sustainability 
agenda which encompasses environmental protection, global equity and 
social justice (Murphy and Bendell, 1997:90). 
 
In the following section, we consider how NGOs in different sectors and 
geographical settings are responding to the sustainable development challenge and 
how their relationships with business are evolving in the process. 
 
NGO RESPONSES TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
 
Globalization and its consequences have undermined the credibility and legitimacy 
of many systems and structures of governance. Is this merely about market 
institutions usurping the power of the state? Or does this also provide 
unprecedented opportunities for the global emergence of a third sector alliance 
of NGOs? (de Oliveira and Tandon, 1994:4). 
 
As agents of civil society, NGOs are gaining greater recognition and power at the 
international (and, in many cases, national and local) policy levels. The growing 
participation of large numbers of different NGOs in United Nations conferences, 
meetings and other official processes confirms this trend (Krut, 1997). At the same 
time, many NGOs are finding themselves with growing responsibility and 
legitimacy as corporate watchdogs and agents of sustainable development. All 
NGOs, however, do not have the same global political access and recognition, nor 
do they all have the same opportunity or inclination to influence business 
behaviour either adversely via protest or positively via partnership. The global 
NGO movement remains exceedingly diverse, largely disorganized and quite often 
divided. 
 
 Defining NGOs 
 
The common understanding about NGOs is that they are non-profit as well as non-
governmental. However, non-profit is not an appropriate descriptor, as it could 
also include organizations that lobby on behalf of commercial interests, such as the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and other trade or industry 
associations. Furthermore, the non-profit tag would exclude local co-operatives 
that may seek to make a profit for their members and community, but which are 
generally considered part of civil society.  
 
Another problem with the term NGO is that it describes a wide range of civil 
society groups such as peoples associations, membership organizations and 
service providers. It clearly encompasses a broad range of organizations in terms 
of size, purpose, funding base and organizational structure. Nevertheless, NGO is 
now widely used in academic, media and international policy circles as a general 
term for third-sector or civil society organizations.  
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Despite the enormous diversity of NGOs worldwide, a general definition of NGOs 
is nonetheless possible within the context of this discussion. NGOs are civil 
society groups that have as their primary purpose the promotion of social and/or 
environmental goals rather than the achievement of economic power in the 
marketplace or political power through the electoral process. NGOs acquire 
resources primarily through the integrative power of the citizen, whereas 
governments primarily do so through threat power and business organizations 
primarily through economic power (Korten, 1990:97). 
 
NGOs include organizations as diverse as an international, multimillion dollar 
operation such as the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and a local farmers 
group such as the Association of Sarva Seva Farms (ASSEFA) in India. In order to 
distinguish between larger NGOs and less formal, often smaller civil society 
organizations, we also refer to community, citizen or activist groups. Community 
or citizen groups indicate locality of membership and purpose. Activist groups 
reflect primacy of protest over service delivery or policy-level advocacy. In the 
1990s, the concept of sustainable development is being embraced in different ways 
by a variety of NGOs, community, citizen and activist groups in the fields of 
environment, development and human rights. 
 
 Three or Four Waves of Environmental NGOs? 
 
In the North, environmental NGOs have evolved toward a sustainable development 
orientation through three waves of environmentalism (Murphy and Bendell, 1997). 
The first began at the turn of the twentieth century as a residue of the Romantic 
Movement, which had championed a return to nature in the wake of the industrial 
revolution. People were primarily concerned with preserving what was wild or 
natural. It was a Western-centric concept of a divide between humans and nature 
and led to the creation of the first national parks.  
 
The second wave in most Northern, industrialized countries began in the 1960s. 
Due in part to the socio-economic changes that supported a variety of new social 
movements at the time, this environmentalism stressed the oneness of humans and 
our environment. The emerging science of ecology and the Apollo pictures of the 
Earth in space helped create this environmental consciousness. The first major 
environmental campaigning groups were set up around this time and focused 
primarily on increasing regulation to protect people from industrial pollution. 
 
The third wave began in the mid- to late 1980s. With increasing resources but 
insufficient progress at the international and national policy levels, environmental 
NGOs began to seek practical ways of moving forward and implementing 
solutions. The global environmental problematique began to be broken down into 
everyday issues with practical remedies. Third-wave environmentalism places 
increasing emphasis on market-oriented campaigns. Recently there have been calls 
for a fourth wave of environmentalism, particularly from Mark Dowie, who 
describes this fourth wave as: 
 
. . . a broad-based, multi-ethnic movement that takes a long-term global 
view, challenges prevailing economic assumptions, promotes 
environmental protection as an extension of human rights, and engages in 
direct action when necessary (199192:90). 
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We accept Dowies suggestion that Northern environmental groups should 
integrate the lessons of the grassroots into their strategies (ibid.). However, in 
many respects third-wave environmentalism has already begun to adopt 
environmental justice and sustainability ideals and strategies, the latter including 
direct action, consumer boycotts, corporate dialogue and North-South NGO 
alliances. 
 
 Four Generations of Development NGOs 
 
Development NGOs based in the North have also begun to embrace the 
sustainability agenda. Korten (1990) describes three generations of development 
NGO strategies. First-generation development NGOs focus on the provision of 
disaster relief and welfarethe original role of Northern NGOs such as Oxfam. 
Second-generation strategies focus on promoting small-scale, self-reliant 
community development. And third-generation strategies involve increasingly 
large and sophisticated NGOs working in a catalytic, foundation-like role rather 
than an operational service-delivery role . . . facilitating . . . other organisations [to 
develop] the capacities, linkages and commitments required to address designated 
needs on a sustained basis (Korten, 1987:149).  
 
Later, we describe a natural extension of this third-generation strategy, with 
development NGOs beginning to influence the role of international and local 
businesses in the social sustainability of the South. Korten goes on to describe the 
need for fourth-generation NGOs, which aim to build a critical mass of 
independent, decentralized initiative in support of a social vision (1990:127). Part 
of this strategy is building links between different NGOs and addressing the more 
structural issues at the heart of social and environmental problems. Whereas third-
generation NGOs seek changes in specific policies and institutions, Korten 
suggests that fourth-generation NGOs will facilitate the coming together of loosely 
defined networks of people and organizations to transform the institutions of 
global society (1990:123). 
 
 Southern NGOs 
 
The typologies outlined above are particularly relevant for understanding the role 
of Northern-based NGOs in promoting sustainable development. Despite recent 
efforts by both development and environmental NGOs to broaden their respective 
agendas, for the most part they remain distinctive organizational types. For many 
Southern NGOs, community and activist groups, however, the division between 
environment and development is not so clear cut. For example, the Malaysia-based 
Third World Network or the Mexican Coalition on Environment and Development 
embrace a broader sustainable development agenda than Northern NGOs such as 
WWF or Oxfam. While many Southern environmental NGOs remain urban, 
middle-class membership organizations with limited grassroots connections, there 
are numerous examples of environmental NGO collaboration with peasant 
organizations and indigenous peoples, particularly in Latin America and Asia 
(Reilly, 1995; Heyzer et al., 1995). 
 
When local Southern groups protest against their lands being acquired, or their 
rivers being poisoned, they are fighting for their mutual, material interests 
(Collinson, 1996). The environmental problems faced by peoples of developing 
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countries often have far more severe effects on their livelihoods than for people in 
the North. In recent years, many Southern groups have begun to assume the 
language of Northern environmental NGOs and present their dilemmas in 
environmental terms. Martin Khor of the Third World Network captures this 
phenomenon well with the following comments: 
 
Our goals in the South are about survival, humanity and dignity. And 
democracy. A great deal of energy has been spent in the South . . . in 
helping social movements regain their right to land and other resources, in 
order to promote their rights to good health and adequate nutrition, to 
safety, to housing, and to a sustainable environment. All these changes are 
necessary for both social justice and a sound environmental and 
development policy (1993:223). 
 
As well as adopting the terminology of sustainable development, Southern NGOs 
are also fostering better links with their counterparts in both the North and other 
parts of the South. This is an outcome of both the information technology 
revolution and NGO participation in global conferences before, during and after 
the Earth Summit (McCoy and McCully, 1993; Krut, 1997). Information 
technology is also facilitating the communication of corporate abuses 
instantaneously via e-mail to the home countries of the international companies 
involved (Johnston, 1997). As a result, some Southern NGOs are also beginning to 
develop a new focus on market-oriented campaigns similar to the tactics of many 
Northern NGOs.  
 
 NGO Diversity and Tension 
 
Notwithstanding the above comments, the global NGO movement remains 
extremely heterogeneous, not merely along traditional environment-development 
or North-South divides. Whether one compares NGOs on a global or even on a 
national basis, there are no doubt many more differences in NGO philosophy, 
purpose and strategy than there are similarities. Despite considerable and worthy 
efforts to promote North-South NGO alliances and the idea of a global civil 
society, numerous tensions between NGOs remain. NGOs worldwide face many 
different and potentially competing courses of action. 
 
There is the further problem of what some describe as the commodification of 
certain NGO activities into areas such as contractual service delivery and 
consultancy-type work (Uphoff, 1996). If this is a growing trend, as some 
commentators argue, then it may have implications for business-NGO relations. As 
and when greater numbers of NGOs begin to think and act more commercially, to 
what extent will they be able to remain effective corporate watchdogs? This may 
not be merely a matter of co-optation. The growing commercial orientation of 
certain NGOs may reflect a more general blurring of the boundaries between 
NGOs and business, similar to the emergence of activist companies such as The 
Body Shop and of entrepreneurial NGOs such as ORAP in Zimbabwe. If this is the 
case, then perhaps closer and more collaborative relations between certain 
businesses and NGOs are not only desirable but also inevitable.  
 
Many NGOs would challenge this assumption. Notwithstanding the value of closer 
co-operation between all three sectors of societygovernment, commercial and 
civilthere remains a need for a critical and independent NGO voice. NGO 
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protest continues to play a vital role in mobilizing citizens to promote sustainable 
development through policy changes at all levels of society. Without such forms of 
confrontation, meaningful forms of business-NGO partnership may never come to 
fruition.  
 
 Case Studies of Business-NGO Relations  
 
Academic inquiry into how NGOs influence corporate policies related to 
sustainable development is a relatively new venture. Scholarly debates about the 
potential for partnerships between business and NGOs in the South are even less 
common. Indeed, there is little empirical research on the nature of conflicts and 
alliances between NGOs and private sector companies that have led to 
environmentally and/or socially advantageous outcomes in both the North and the 
South. Instead, most research in this area focuses on the role of government in 
mediating conflicts between business and local communities, or on government-
NGO relations. Information on direct relations between NGOs and business is 
largely anecdotal. In order to help fill this gap, we present three short case studies 
of business-NGO relations on sustainable development with examples from both 
the North and the South. 
 
First, to illustrate the myriad relations between civil society and business, we 
provide a broad review of protest and partnership between various NGOs and 
companies involved in the tropical timber trade since the mid-1980s. Second, to 
reveal how co-ordinated global protest affects TNC activities in both North and 
South, we focus on relations between Shell and various NGOs in the 1990s. Third, 
to outline the politics and processes of complex multi-stakeholder North-South 
partnerships, we describe the Project to Eliminate Child Labour in the Pakistan 
Soccer Ball Industry. This case demonstrates the growing importance of 
environment, health and safety (EHS) standards for the many global companies 
that have shifted the manufacturing of finished products to factories in the South. 
 
Planting Seeds of Change: Protesting and Partnering to Save 
the Tropical Rainforests2 
                                                     
 
Deforestation emerged as a significant international policy issue and major 
Northern media story in the mid-1980s (Humphreys, 1997). Since that time the 
rates of forest degradation have shown little evidence of slowing. Despite lengthy 
consultations among governments, and rising concerns from the public reaching a 
peak at the 1992 Earth Summit, rapid deforestation continues unabated. According 
to some estimates, tropical forests are disappearing at the rate of nearly 1 per cent 
per year, with the annual deforestation rate in the Brazilian Amazon increasing 34 
per cent between 1991 and 1994 (United Nations, 1997; Serrill, 1997).  
 
The main causes of deforestation are logging, mining, iron smelting, cattle 
ranching, cash cropping, dam construction, road building, housing and hotel 
development, shifting agriculture and fuelwood collection. This case focuses on 
the causes and responses to the crisis that directly involve Northern countries and 
their companies, and specifically the international timber trade. Robert Repetto 
2 This case study is based in part on previously published material (Bendell and Sullivan, 
1996; Murphy, 1996; Murphy and Bendell, 1997) 
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and Malcolm Gillis argued in 1988 that commercial logging was the top agent of 
deforestation, and around this time it was also popularly considered to be the case. 
 
Government and industry initiatives for rainforest protection 
For much of the 1980s and 1990s, governments and various international bodies 
have attempted to respond to the worldwide concern about tropical deforestation. 
The first international instrument for tropical forests came with the 1983 
International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA), which provides a framework for 
co-operation and consultation between tropical timber producers and consumers on 
a range of issues. In May 1991, members of the International Tropical Timber 
Organisation (ITTO) approved a Year 2000 Target for sustainable forest 
management. The general NGO feeling is that the ITTO has been too complacent 
about tropical deforestation in that it has avoided challenging the destructive 
activities of the timber industry (FoE-UK, 1992:5). 
 
At the regional and national levels in the South, some governments have 
introduced new policy instruments to monitor logging company activities. The 
South Pacific Forum Code of Conduct for Logging of Indigenous Forests sets 
minimum standards for the preparation and implementation of work programmes 
by concession holders. Similarly, the Forestry Commission of Guyana has 
introduced a code of practice for the operation of natural forest concessions 
(Murphy, 1997b). 
 
At the international level, the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (WBCSD) formed in 1995 by the merger of the BCSD and the WIC 
recently commissioned an independent study of the pulp and paper industry. The 
study recommended that the industry consider developing a code of conduct 
similar to the chemical industrys Responsible Care, with the added feature of 
sector-wide monitoring of company performance (WBCSD, 1996). 
 
The first global certification system for well-managed forests, however, was set up 
in 1993 by civil society working in partnership with business. This scheme, with a 
variety of NGO and industry members from the North and South, is called the 
Forest Stewardship Council (to which we will return later). The reasons why 
companies in the timber trade have collaborated with NGOs can only be 
understood by examining the role played by civil society in shaping the 
deforestation issue since the mid-1980s. 
 
Civil society protest in the South  
One of the major stages for deforestation and conflict in the 1980s was Amazonia. 
The problem was particularly acute in Brazil, where the military junta was trying 
to civilize the region by facilitating billions of dollars of subsidies and tax 
breaks for entrepreneurs to buy up land and develop the forest (Revkin, 1990). 
Unions of rubber tappers led the fight against cattle ranchers and loggers. Meagre 
rubber-tapper livelihoods were being threatened because rubber barons realized 
they could make more money cutting down the trees and grazing cattle. The 
tappers decided to stage empates, whereby chain-saw gangs were confronted and 
asked to leave the land they were clearing. These protests raised the attention of 
the international media so that by the mid-1980s . . . indigenous groups and 
tappers were considered legitimate participants in the debate (Dore, 1996:15). 
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One protester who rose to international fame was Chico Mendes, the leader of the 
Xapuri Rural Workers Union. He soon became a symbol of the human dimension 
to the deforestation issue. Furthermore, with his involvement the authorities could 
no longer dismiss efforts to save the rain forests as foreigners interfering with 
Brazilian affairs (Rowell, 1996a:214). 
 
The empates worked as a tactic: by December 1988, some 3 million acres of the 
Amazon had been saved (Hecht and Cockburn, 1990). After one particular 
incident, the authorities bought out the prospective rancher so that his plans could 
not proceed. In revenge, the rancher ordered the killing of Mendes in December 
1988. Mendes was the ninetieth rural activist to be murdered in Brazil that year 
(Hall, 1996). After his death, the worlds news media reverberated with headlines 
and leading stories on the rubber tappers and deforestation. Following the 
international condemnation that followed Mendes murder, the new civilian 
administration of President Sarney established a new environmental control 
agency (IBAMA) to promote a new environmental policy (Nossa Natureza) and 
set up several protected extractive reserves (ibid.). 
 
Grassroots action by Southern unions backed up by international concern, 
therefore, did bring some specific successes. Indeed, the combined protests of civil 
society groups in tropical forest countries in the 1980s began to shape a new 
international policy debate. In the 1970s and 1980s cattle ranching and logging 
were almost universally promoted as the best way to develop tropical forest 
regions. By 1990 they had become a symbol of destruction. 
 
Civil society protest in the North  
With increased NGO campaigning and media coverage, the profile of 
environmental issues rose in most Northern countries in the late 1980s. As the 
struggles of indigenous peoples against tropical deforestation became known, the 
role of the timber trade became a key consumer concern. For example, a wooden 
product such as mahogany came to be associated with the murder of forest 
dwellers. At this time, local, largely autonomous Rainforest Action Groups 
(RAGs) in North America, Europe and Australia were formed.  
 
In Great Britain, beginning in the spring of 1991, various RAGs started to take 
direct action against wood-product retailers. These groups organized mock 
chainsaw massacres outside do-it-yourself (DIY) home improvement and furniture 
stores, with protesters dressed as loggers graphically depicting the destruction of 
the worlds rainforests. Protesters distributed leaflets to customers and delivered 
anti-tropical timber pledges to store managers. The intention was to discourage 
customers from buying tropical timber products. 
 
In 1991, local Friends of the Earth (FoE) groups in the United Kingdom built upon 
the initial RAG protests. On one November weekend, there were over 100 
demonstrations, including 2530 demonstrations outside the outlets of DIY market 
leader B&Q plc. Subsequently, on 11 December, FoE-UK claimed in a press 
release that its protests had prompted dramatic policy developments in the DIY 
retailers B&Q, Texas Homecare and Homebase, which were now committed to 
stop selling environmentally damaging tropical rainforest timber (FoE-UK, 
1991b). The anti-DIY demonstrations proved to be highly successful and garnered 
considerable media and public attention. Customers began to write letters to the 
retailers and to confront store managers and employees with tough questions about 
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timber sourcing. For the most part, the companies took both the protests and 
customer letters very seriously. 
 
Meanwhile, WWF-International was itself beginning to turn to industry, having 
become disillusioned with protracted international negotiations on a global forest 
convention and other international policy initiatives. In 1989, WWF had already 
announced its own 1995 target for the worlds timber trade to be sustainable. At 
the 1992 Earth Summit, governments could only produce the toothless Non-
legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus 
on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of all Types 
of Forests. Francis Sullivan, then WWF-UK forest officer, believed you cant 
just sit back and wait for governments to agree, because this could take forever.3 
He felt certain it was right to try and work with people and companies who might 
be able to get things done. 
 
The emergence of timber industry-NGO partnerships 
For the DIY trade, WWF-UK appeared to be a solution to a mounting business 
problem. Following WWF-UKs Forests Are Your Business seminar in 
December 1991, 10 companies committed themselves to reaching the WWF-UK 
1995 target and launched the so-called 1995 Group. The cumulative effects of 
different forms of environmental campaigning seemed to have firmly taken root in 
the private sector. The chainstore massacre demonstrations and resulting 
consumer awareness were instrumental, as was the catalytic role of WWF-UK via 
its forest seminars. Internally, directors of the targeted companies were worried 
about the public relations and commercial implications of the protests, customer 
letters and media coverage. Other pressures from investors, insurers and lenders 
were on the horizon.  
 
To join the 1995 Group, companies had to agree to phase out (by 1995) the 
purchase and sale of all wood and wood products not sourced from well-managed 
forests. In pursuit of this target they had to provide WWF-UK with a written action 
programme detailing how the company would reach the target and then submit 
regular six-monthly reports on their progress. It soon became apparent, however, 
that the participating companies needed a credible system for defining good forest 
management and for ensuring that products were from such forests.  
 
What was needed was a standard-setting body with a system for verifying product 
claims. Following 18 months of preparatory work, the Forest Stewardship Council 
(FSC) was launched in 1993. The founding group consisted of environmental 
NGOs, forest industry representatives, community forestry groups and forest 
product certification organizations. Both WWF-International and B&Q provided 
financial and logistical support, among other organizations.  
 
The FSC mission statement commits members to promote management of the 
worlds forests that is environmentally appropriate, socially beneficial and 
economically viablelanguage consistent with the principles of sustainable 
development. The FSC accredits certification bodies to ensure that they adhere to 
FSC principles and criteria when certifying forests as well-managed, and allows 
them to issue the FSC logo once a chain of custody has been recorded from the 
forest to the company selling the end product.  
                                                     
3  Interview with D.F. Murphy, November 1994. 
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By the end of 1995, commercial support for the FSC had spiralled in the UK. The 
WWF-UK 1995 Group had reached 47 members, accounting for about a quarter of 
the British consumption of wood products. Although many of the companies did 
not reach the 1995 target, a significant number had purchased certified timber and 
had specified where most if not all their timber was coming from. The Group was 
consequently extended with the revised target that companies would purchase 
wood only from certified forests by the year 2000. As of late 1997, there were over 
80 members in the new 1995 Plus Group.  
 
Partnerships between the timber industry and NGOs are growing in other 
countries. There are similar timber buyers groups or business-NGO partnerships 
committed to the FSC in Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and the United States. The Dutch Hart Voor Hout initiative dates back 
to early 1992, and many of its developments paralleled the British experience, 
namely the catalytic role of protest in leading DIY retailers to seek NGO partners 
(Murphy, 1996). 
 
The impetus for Northern buyer groups, of course, comes from Northern 
consumers, campaigners, corporations and NGOs. However, members of Southern 
civil society also have a voice in the process through the FSC. Representatives of 
NGOs, such as the Foundation of the Peoples of the South Pacific (Papua New 
Guinea), FUDENA (Venezuela) and SKEPHI (Indonesia) participate in the FSC as 
either Board representatives or members of specialist working groups. At the 
national level in the South, FSC working groups have been established to ensure 
that the global principles and criteria are adapted to the local context (e.g., Brazil, 
Cameroon). Although only 25 per cent of current FSC members are from the 
South, the organization is supporting efforts to increase this number. Furthermore 
a special working group on social aspects of certification is attempting to find 
ways in which the social performance of the FSC could be improved (Colchester, 
1997). 
 
Before partnerships between timber companies and NGOs, there was no 
functioning mechanism whereby consumer power in industrialized countries could 
be captured to promote sustainable forest management around the world. As of 
December 1997, 5.5 million hectares of forest had been certified worldwide.  
 
The absence of a significant number of partnership initiatives in the South suggests 
that many of the driving forces behind greater responsibility in the timber industry 
are peculiar to Northern countries. From the above, it is apparent that NGO and 
consumer pressure in a Northern context often has a profound effect on corporate 
public image and a perceived need on the companys part to respond positively. 
Collaborating with a well-known environmental NGO also promises additional 
benefits to those normally gained from internal environmental management 
initiatives (Bendell and Warner, 1996). In addition to help with getting the job 
done, significant public relations benefits may be gained from collaborating with 
NGOs. For example, the participation of WWF in the FSC scheme has helped to 
reassure customers that participating company claims are credible. 
 
Criticism of timber industry-NGO partnerships 
Notwithstanding the progress to date, there is considerable criticism about the role 
and contribution of the FSC scheme. Some have challenged the use of market 
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mechanisms for rainforest conservation by arguing that such schemes fail to 
address the underlying causes of deforestation and the infringement of indigenous 
peoples land rights (Corry, 1993). Others are concerned about how commercial 
interests might undermine social and environmental matters in the certification 
process. 
 
Criticism has also come from timber traders and producers who do not support the 
FSC form of certification. On a practical level, some companies argue that 
producer certification would be too expensive and bureaucratic to implement 
across the whole of the industry. Others have difficulty with the FSC in principle, 
suggesting that non-governmental bodies do not have the authority to regulate a 
companys forest management practices. This, they argue, is the role of sovereign 
governments or inter-governmental organizations (Harris, 1996). 
 
Some critics in government, business and civil society argue that the championing 
of the FSC by Northern NGOs and companies is another example of the 
industrialized North imposing its perception of environmental problems and 
remedies upon the rest of the world. Whereas the social, political and cultural 
contexts in many Northern countries have produced a concerned retail trade and an 
impetus for certification, the situation in the East and South is different. 
 
Japan, the largest importer of tropical timber and timber products in the world, has 
not yet become an advocate for a sustainable timber trade. Despite the presence of 
a well-organized environmental movement, there has been limited Japanese NGO 
pressure and consumer demand for certified wood products (Wadsworth, 1996). 
The rise of consumer concern and business response in most other Northern 
countries, therefore, may just serve to shift international trade patterns, with 
certified timber going to Europe and North America and non-certified timber going 
to Japan and, increasingly, South-East Asia. 
 
The recent moves of companies from countries such as Malaysia, Thailand and 
Indonesia into the tropical rainforests of Latin America, the South Pacific and the 
Congo basin is worrying. To illustrate, in Papua New Guinea, Malaysias largest 
logging company, Rimbunan Hijau, now controls at least 60 percent of the 
governments 21.5 million-acre forestry concession area through more than 20 
subsidiaries (Ito and Loftus, 1997). Despite recent attempts to introduce codes of 
conduct, the prospects for influencing these concessions through legal or market 
mechanisms appear bleak. Faced with national debt and a need to attract foreign 
direct investment (FDI), most governments of tropical forest countries appear to be 
locked into a race to the bottom of environmental regulation.  
 
New tools and tactics for forest protesters 
In response to the apparent inability of governments to curb the ongoing 
destruction of tropical forests, civil society organizations in both North and South 
are developing new tactics and using new tools to influence corporate behaviour 
(Collinson, 1996; Johnston, 1997). Many protests are aimed at the international 
timber, oil and mining industries. These protests differ from those in the 1980s in 
two significant ways. The first relates to the use of information technology and the 
second to a new focus on Northern markets. Together, these developments are 
leading to a new level of North-South co-operation in civil society. 
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The role of electronic information technology in Southern forest struggles first 
gained major significance during the Zapatista uprising in the forested Chiapas 
region of Mexico in 1994. Protesters could send their complaints, including those 
about the environmental degradation of the Lacandon Biosphere Reserve, around 
the world by electronic mail (e-mail). Journalists and activists on the appropriate e-
mail lists thus received immediate accounts of the events unfolding: it was the first 
on-line revolution (Stea et al., 1997:218). Communication technology is also 
helping forge new alliances between local, national and international groups.  
 
The second dimension to the campaigning of Southern groups is an increasing 
focus on Northern markets. The struggle of the Guarani and Tupinikim Indians in 
Brazil against the paper and pulp company Aracruz Cellulose is an example of 
such a strategy. The Guarani and Tupinikim Indians have been contesting the 
Aracruz operations on their traditional lands for many years. When the government 
announced that Indians could lay claim to their traditional lands there was hope 
that the Guarani and Tupinikim would benefit. In 1993 the executive commission 
of the two tribes submitted an application to annex 13,274 hectares. However, an 
adjustment to the law in 1996 allowed prospective logging companies to appeal 
against the claims of forest dwellers. Aracruz launched such an appeal and the 
Guarani and Tupinikim became concerned that their claim would be rejected. In 
response they began an international campaign to raise awareness of their cause.  
 
In early 1997, representatives of the tribes, together with Dutch campaigner 
Winfred Overbeek, visited Norway and Great Britain to put their case to the 
customers of, and investors in, Aracruz Cellulose. In Norway, the group tried to 
talk with Aracruz shareholders Den Norsk Bank and the Lorentzen Group. Den 
Norske Bank did not want to talk with the indigenous representatives, explains 
Overbeek. Consequently, the representatives took their case to the government
the Banks major shareholderand the media. Questions in parliament and reports 
on television and radio followed. In response, the Minister of Trade and 
Commerce stated that there was no way for the Norwegian Government to define 
how Den Norske Bank applies its money. The international campaign also 
included meetings with members of the WWF-UK 1995 Plus Group, the FSC-
accredited Soil Association and the Paper Federation of Great Britain. The 
companies and organizations agreed to examine closely the decision on the 
demarcation of the disputed lands.  
 
Meanwhile, in the South the benefits of establishing communication with Aracruz 
management seem limited. Against a history of violencean activist for the tribes, 
Paulo Cesar Vinha, was murdered in 1993prospects for dialogue with Aracruz 
appear bleak. Indeed, the international campaign of the Guarani and Tupinikim 
appears to have generated a retaliatory public relations campaign. Aracruz has 
contracted Burson-Marsteller, the worlds largest public relations (PR) company, 
to curb growing support for their international campaign. The Aracruz response 
appears to be the antithesis of many other companies who are engaging 
constructively and openly with civil society in order to help reduce deforestation. 
 
The seeds of change? 
This case study has described varying degrees of corporate responsibility for 
tropical deforestation and a range of tactics employed by NGOs. It appears that 
some companies are either unable or unwilling to embrace environmental 
concerns. Further research is needed to reveal the variety of financial, political and 
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cultural factors that enable some companies to engage NGOs and indigenous 
peoples on the deforestation issue while others avoid, undermine or kill their 
critics. For those companies that have moved forward with NGO partnerships, 
progress appears to have been the result of both personal and organizational 
commitment. The motivation of key individuals seems to be particularly 
significant. WWF-Internationals Francis Sullivan explains: 
 
Success has boiled down to the commitment of individuals and the 
support that senior management has given to those individuals. . . . You 
have some companies that are not particularly committed themselves, but 
you have got an individual in there who is unbelievably committed to 
actually getting the thing sorted out.
4
 
 
The support that these individuals have received in different companies, 
organizations and countries illustrates how the boundaries of corporate social and 
environmental responsibility have been shifting dramatically, alongside rapid 
developments in the tools and tactics of NGOs. We have observed the role of 
protest, North and South, in raising public and consumer awareness about adverse 
effects of tropical deforestation. At the same time, market leaders have responded 
to this pressure as an opportunity to maintain leadership in a changing 
marketplace. This in turn has cleared the way for some of the more cautious 
competitors to follow, thereby planting the seeds of transformation in the timber 
trade. 
 
After the Shell Shock: Protest, Partnership and the Global Oil 
Industry5 
 
The oil industry is one of biggest sectors in the global economy, with an average 
daily production of 61.9 million barrels valued at over US$ 1 billion (Tippee, 
1997).6 The 1997 Business Week Global 1000 survey of the worlds leading 
companies ranked Shell and Exxon first and second in profits at US$ 9.3 and US$ 
7.5 billion respectively. In terms of market value, six oil companies were ranked in 
the top 50.  
 
The Royal Dutch Shell Group is one of the top three corporations in the world in 
terms of size, comprising more than 300 individual companies based in over 100 
countries. Shells annual global turnover is in the vicinity of US$ 100 billion. Until 
recently, Shell had a reputation as an environmental leader dating back many 
decades. Even before the birth of the contemporary environmental movement in 
the late 1960s, Shell had begun to respond to public concerns about the 
environment. Early examples of company initiatives in the United Kingdom 
include environmental education in the 1940s and a Shell Film Unit documentary 
on air pollution in the 1950s, following the introduction of the British Clean Air 
Acts. Shell also helped launch the Keep Britain Tidy campaign in 1954. 
 
Suddenly in the mid-1990s, Shell became the focus of two high-profile campaigns 
by environmental and human rights NGOs that raised serious questions about the 
                                                     
4 Interview with D.F. Murphy, November 1994. 
5 This case study is based upon research conducted by D.F. Murphy for the New Academy 
of Business. 
6 These are 1995 figures based upon an average crude oil price of US$ 17.24 a barrel. 
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corporations commitment to sustainable development. As noted earlier, the first 
of these confrontations came in mid-1995 when Greenpeace opposed Shells 
efforts to dump the Brent Spar oil platform in the North Atlantic. This was quickly 
followed by complaints about Shell Nigerias use of lower environmental 
standards in the West African countrys Delta region. The company was also 
accused of implicitly supporting human rights abuses given its perceived close 
association with the Nigerian military regime.  
 
The fall-out from both of these episodes has had a negative impact upon the image 
and reputation of Shell and other companies in the global oil industry. Although 
the industry has long been a target of NGO and consumer campaigns, Shells 
recent experience has brought increased pressure and attention. As a result, Shell 
and other oil companies are scrambling to find new ways of relating to NGOs, 
particularly in the South. This case reviews business-NGO relations in the oil 
industry with a particular focus on Shells Nigeria experience. 
 
Strong and aggressive criticism 
The oil and gas industry has historically been among the worlds biggest polluters. 
Public opinion polls in the United States have for many years identified the 
industry as a major polluter (Erskine, 1971). Not surprisingly, the industry was 
also an early target of environmental campaigners in many Northern industrialized 
countries. In 1963, six oil companies formed one of the first industry 
environmental think tanks, Conservation of Clean Air and Water Western Europe 
(CONCAWE), largely in response to strong and aggressive criticism by 
environmentalists and the general public about the industrys gross ecological 
negligence. CONCAWE was designed to establish hard facts [through] 
professional analysis of the underlying nature of the chemistry and physics 
involved. CONCAWE member companies then planned to use this data to define 
the steps needed to redress adverse ecological trends, mishaps and disasters (Han 
Hoog, 1993:45). 
 
Despite industry efforts to prevent environmental disasters, the oil and gas industry 
was implicated in at least 14 major industrial accidents (causing more than 50 
deaths each) between 1970 and 1984. Of a total of more than 2,000 deaths, almost 
1,500 resulted from accidents in developing countries including oil, gas, petrol and 
tanker explosions, offshore-rig collapses and gas pipeline fractures (Shrivastava, 
1987). 
 
In recent years, the industry has continued to face considerable public scrutiny. 
Both before and after the Earth Summit, the oil industry faced heavy international 
pressure about the impact of fossil fuel emissions on global warming. 
Implementation problems with the Rio climate change agreement have been linked 
to the political influence of oil lobby groups, such as the Global Climate Coalition 
and the American Petroleum Institute. Lobbying strategies include exaggerating 
costs of climate action, emphasizing scientific uncertainties and collaborating with 
governments hostile to action, such as those of the OPEC states (Newell, 1997a 
and 1997b). In the lead-up to the December 1997 Kyoto climate change 
conference, oil industry groups continued to argue against the adoption of tougher 
targets and regulations to reduce carbon emissions.  
 
The idea of environmental injusticea linkage between ecological degradation 
and human rights abuseshas gained worldwide attention largely as a result of the 
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activities of oil companies such as Shell in Nigeria, British Petroleum (BP) in 
Colombia and Texaco in Burma. Various environmental and development NGOs, 
from both North and South, are working together to challenge oil companies to 
promote environmental justice on a variety of fronts, often via the Internet.  
 
Shell, the Ogoni and Nigeria  
Over the years Shell has faced NGO and consumer pressure over a range of social 
responsibility issues, most notably concerning its role in South Africa during the 
apartheid era. Despite considerable international protest in the 1970s and 1980s, 
Shell refused to pull out of its mining, chemicals and petroleum-related activities 
in South Africa, insisting that its employees did not suffer any racial 
discrimination. As noted earlier, on environmental matters the company did not 
face sustained and organized international protest until the Greenpeace Brent Spar 
campaign in 1995, which culminated in Shells decision to abort the deep-sea 
disposal of the oil platform in the face of growing political and consumer pressure 
in Europe. Riding the Brent Spar wave, the media then discovered a much more 
complex and wider environmental and human rights campaign that had been 
raising serious questions about Shells role in Nigeria since the early 1990s. 
 
The Shell Petroleum Development Company is a joint venture between Shell (30 
per cent), the majority shareholder Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC; 
55 per cent) and two other oil companies, Elf (10 per cent) and Agip (5 per cent). 
Shell Petroleum is the largest Nigerian oil and gas exploration and production 
company, with 92 oil fields generating one million barrels daily. The company has 
a 6,200-kilometre network of pipelines and flowlines spread over more than 
31,000 square kilometres of the Niger River Delta. Shell employs 5,000 staff 
directly, including 300 non-Nigerians. According to Shell, more than half of its 
Nigerian staff comes from the Delta region (Shell International, 1995). Shell 
Nigerias annual oil revenue is US$ 11 billion. Nigerias total oil revenues account 
for 90 per cent of its export earnings and 80 per cent of total government revenue. 
 
Protest beginsThe origins of Shells recent problems in Nigeria lie in a history 
of considerable environmental pollution in the Niger Delta region. From 198292, 
1.6 million gallons of oil were spilled from Shells Nigerian fields in 27 separate 
incidents. Of all oil spills attributed to Shell worldwide, 40 per cent happened in 
Nigeria. Various Niger Delta communities have experienced Shells gas flaring 24 
hours a day for 30 years (Rowell, 1995). 
 
Shells main opponent in Nigeria has been the Movement for the Survival of the 
Ogoni People (MOSOP), an activist NGO with the linked goals of social justice 
and environmental protection. The Ogoni is an ethnic group of 500,000 people 
living in 82 communities covering 1,000 square kilometres in the Delta region in 
the southeast of the country. Most Ogoni are engaged in farming and fishing, with 
a minority working in the oil industry either for Shell or contractor firms. Shell 
estimates that from 198792 it spent about US$ 2 million on the Ogoni area, about 
16 per cent of the community budget for its Eastern Divisions operation. By 1993, 
the company was extracting up to 28,000 barrels of oil per day from Ogoniland 
(Rowell, 1995). 
 
The first demonstration against Shell was staged in 1987 by the Iko community in 
the Andoni ethnic area of the Delta. When Shell sought protection from the 
Nigerian Mobile Police Force, two people were killed, some 40 homes were 
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destroyed and more than 350 people were made homeless (Rowell, 1996b). By 
1990, growing numbers of local Delta communities from various ethnic groups 
were demonstrating against Shells activities in the area. Other companies were 
also targeted, but Shell was singled out as the largest and most visible player in the 
local oil industry. Shell officials acknowledged that there were 63 protests against 
the company in 1990 alone. At one demonstration in Ogoniland, 80 villagers were 
killed by the Nigerian Mobile Police Force. The judicial inquiry which followed 
criticized Shell on two major counts: first for the companys unfair acquisitions of 
Ogoni lands for its oil operations; and second for the environmental degradation 
caused and meagre compensation paid by the company to affected Ogoni 
communities (Goodall, 1994).  
 
Ogoni leaders signed the Ogoni Bill of Rights in 1990, citing the environmental 
degradation and limited employment opportunities resulting from Shells presence 
in Ogoniland. The Nigerian military regime was also strongly criticized in the 
Ogoni manifesto. Both Shell and the Nigerian government consequently perceived 
both novelist Ken Saro-Wiwa and MOSOP as direct threats. 
 
In 1991, Saro-Wiwa became MOSOPs international spokeperson. Later that year, 
Ogoni leaders updated the Bill of Rights and authorized MOSOP to 
internationalize its campaign against the Nigerian government and oil companies 
operating in Nigeria (MOSOP, 1992). Meanwhile local protests against Shell and 
other oil companies continued. 
 
The following year MOSOP presented its case to the United Nations Commission 
on Human Rights. MOSOP also officially submitted its demands to all oil 
companies operating in Ogoniland, including Shell, Chevron and the NNPC. The 
companies were asked to pay back-royalties and compensation within 30 days or 
cease their operations in Ogoniland. Local protests against Shell continued 
throughout 1992. 
 
Ogoni campaign goes globalBy 1993, the Ogoni campaign against Shell and 
the Nigerian government began to attract international attention. On 4 January, 
MOSOP organized a major rally of 300,000 people against the oil industry to 
celebrate the Year of Indigenous Peoples. Later that month, MOSOP was accepted 
as a member of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (UNPO). As 
a result, the Ogoni case received its first major media exposure with coverage by 
CNN, Time magazine and the British Channel 4. The latters Drilling Fields 
launched a series of documentaries on the tensions between Shell and the Ogoni. 
 
Around this time, The Body Shop took the issue up as one of the companys 
campaign issues, working in a loose alliance with MOSOP, Greenpeace 
International, and other NGOs. Various independent journalists and filmmakers 
also began to lend support to the Ogoni cause. The Shell-Ogoni story had gone 
global. 
 
The full Shell-Ogoni story is long and complex. In the interest of brevity, the key 
events from 199397 are merely highlighted below: 
 
 1993: As the MOSOP campaign against Shell intensifies, the company decides 
to withdraw its staff from the Ogoni area in late January, citing intimidation, 
attacks and the destruction of equipment. Under the protection of Nigerian 
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soldiers, personnel from Shell and a US subcontractor return to the area in 
April to begin work on a new pipeline. After Ogoni crops are destroyed, local 
protesters block the path of the bulldozers. Following many days of 
confrontation between the Ogoni and the soldiers, one person is shot dead and 
more than 20 are wounded. Shell finally ceases production work in Ogoniland 
in June. In July 1993, Ken Saro-Wiwa is elected President of MOSOP. 
 1994: In January, three major oil companies announce losses in excess of 
US$ 300 million during 1993 due to unfavourable conditions in their areas of 
operation (UNPO, 1995:51). They call for urgent action to resolve the 
situation. In April, the Nigerian military intervenes in a local conflict between 
the Ogoni and another ethnic group. Fifteen Ogoni people are arrested without 
being charged. Nigerian soldiers attack, raid and burn Ogoni villages. More 
than 20 people are reportedly killed. On 1 May, UNPO calls on Shell to use 
whatever influence it has to persuade the Nigerian government to release Ogoni 
prisoners. On 21 May, four traditional Ogoni elders are murdered by a mob at a 
local rally. Saro-Wiwa does not attend the rally. On 22 May, Saro-Wiwa and 
more than 50 other Ogoni men are arrested. Saro-Wiwa is accused of inciting a 
crowd of his supporters to kill the traditional elders. In July, Greenpeace 
International condemns Shells misguided priorities and public relations 
approach to the problems in Nigeria (1994:22). 
 1995: In January, a military tribunal begins to hear the Saro-Wiwa/Ogoni case. 
In August, from his jail cell, Saro-Wiwa calls on the international community to 
boycott Nigerian oil. Throughout the year the pressure grows on Shell to use its 
perceived political influence to seek the prisoners freedom. On 1 November, 
the Financial Times publishes a letter from Anita Roddick of The Body Shop 
calling on Shell to publicly condemn the military tribunal for the sham that it 
is. On 10 November, Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni are hanged. The World 
Bank withdraws its loan for Shell Nigerias planned US$ 4.2 billion natural gas 
project. On 13 November, Shell announces it will proceed with the project. On 
17 November, Shell organizes an informal Nigeria briefing for 35 British 
NGOs. Greenpeace is not invited. Global media coverage of the Saro-Wiwa 
execution focuses on Shells role and responsibilities. Shells response to the 
criticism is that politics is the business of government and politicians and the 
company does not and should not have [political] influence in Nigeria (NGO 
Task Force on Business and Industry, 1997:18). 
 1996: Shell announces new initiatives in Nigeria, including a US$ 850 million 
upgrade of two crude oil terminals and flow-line renovations to current 
standards. At Shells Annual General Meeting in May, the company announces 
that it will conduct a major international review of its Statement of General 
Business Principles. International protest against Shell continues, particularly 
via networks of linked activist Web sites on the Internet. Shells Internet critics 
range from large organizations such as Amnesty International, Sierra Club and 
The Body Shop to lesser known groups such as Oilwatch, Earthlife Africa, One 
World Online and the Public Media Centre. 
 1997: In January the World Council of Churches (WCC) publishes a report, 
which argues that Shell has been justifiably criticized for its operations in 
Ogoniland. In March, Shell releases its revised business principles, which 
include for the first time explicit support for human rights. Amnesty 
International welcomes Shells move but argues that it is now up to Shell to 
prove its commitment through practical action. In May, Shell publishes its first 
public report on community and environmental issues in Nigeria. The report 
establishes new targets, including an end to gas flaring within 10 years. Shell 
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also launches a youth training scheme in Ogoniland. In September, the 
Canadian government introduces a voluntary policy initiative, the International 
Code of Ethics for Canadian Business, largely in response to Shells 
controversial role in Nigeria (Ross, 1997). Meanwhile, various Internet sites 
continue to call on Web surfers to Boycott Shell Now until the company 
stops its practice of double standards, and supports an independent 
environmental assessment of the Niger delta. 
 
Shell continues to face considerable pressure from its critics even as it introduces 
new environmental and social policies and programmes. Shell has indicated that it 
will be placing new emphasis upon implementation procedures. One of the key 
lessons that Shell appears to have learned from the past few years is the need to 
enhance its transparency and communication with a wider range of stakeholders. 
Greater sensitivity to social and environmental concerns has, nevertheless, failed 
to stop the international protest against Shell. A remarkably diverse coalition of 
unions, environmental groups, human rights organizations, churches and 
businesses continues to single out Shell for its tacit approval of the oppressive 
military regime in Nigeria (Rowell, 1996b). Shells critics continue to demand that 
the company stop practising double standards. They typically argue that Shells 
behaviour in Nigeria would not have been tolerated in countries with stricter 
standards (NGO Task Force on Business and Industry, 1997).  
 
Such criticism has not deterred Shells efforts to develop new relationships with 
other NGOs. In 1997, Shell attempted to apply the lessons learned from its Nigeria 
experience to a new gas project in the Camisea region of Peru. The proposed site is 
located in a pristine rainforest inhabited by indigenous peoples. Shell announced in 
May 1997 that it had signed an agreement with Red Ambiental Peruana (RAP), a 
social and environmental network, which empowered RAP members to monitor 
the social and environmental performance of the proposed project. Shell also 
supported an elaborate consultation exercise in the Camisea area, which aimed to 
increase the companys knowledge about local environmental, social and 
economic issues. These moves did not, however, stop protest against the project by 
other NGOs and indigenous peoples groups both locally and globally.  
 
Conflicting messages 
The oil industrys overall response to its critics has been mixed in recent years. 
Industry groups such as CONCAWE continue to believe that a rational approach is 
essential to the proper resolution of complex issues (CONCAWE, 1996). 
Underlying this argument is a belief that the industry can solve complex 
environmental problems if it merely gets the scientific facts right. At the same 
time, the industry has indicated that technically sound solutions need to be worked 
out in partnership with its stakeholders. However, CONCAWE fails to include 
NGOs in its list of the industrys stakeholders. 
 
Cracks are nevertheless beginning to appear in the previously unified industry 
front. On the issue of global warming, the worlds third largest oil company, BP, 
recently broke ranks. John Browne, BPs chairman, announced in May 1997 that 
his company accepted that there was sufficient evidence to indicate that the 
burning of fossil fuels is a significant factor in climate change. BP subsequently 
agreed to work with the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) to develop a 
voluntary emissions trading system for greenhouse gases.  
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BPs new commitment to the precautionary principle7 and partnership may reveal 
an oil industry trying to come to terms with the new politics of sustainable 
development. BPs lead on climate change came at a time when the industry and 
Shell were still coming to terms with the fall-out over Brent Spar and Nigeria. For 
its part, BP spent much of 1997 fending off accusations about its complicity in 
human rights abuses and environmental degradation in Colombia. This has 
prompted BP to initiate dialogue with a group of British development NGOs to 
explore issues of mutual concern regarding BPs current activities and future 
projects in Colombia. As market leaders, Shell and BP have found themselves both 
the primary targets of organized protest and at the forefront of industry response to 
the growing complexity of the corporate role in sustainable development. 
 
As Shells experience in Nigeria and Peru illustrates, enhanced dialogue and 
partnership may not be enough to improve the global image of the oil industry. 
Companies like Shell face a dilemma. They are in the business of extracting 
natural resources to meet a growing worldwide demand for energy. The opening 
statement on Shells Internet Web site makes this clear: 
 
Everyone must have energy to live. Shells main business is drawing 
stored energy from the earthas oil, gas and coaland getting it in a 
useful form to where people want it (Shell International, 1997). 
 
As a business argument, this seems to make good economic sense. However, it 
does not allow for any fundamental questioning of resource extraction, processing 
and transportation. There is also no recognition of the need for energy alternatives. 
Extracting resources and getting them to where some people want them may mean 
that other people and their environments are harmed in the process. 
 
Many argue that without ongoing civil society protest, business will have little 
motivation or need to change. At the same time, many questions remain about how 
oil companies should best manage the diverse, complex and sometimes 
contradictory expectations of their stakeholders. Shell Groups Chief Executive 
C.A.J. Herkströter offers a useful starting point: 
 
We must remain sensitive to the evolving needs and concerns of all our 
stakeholders. I fully accept that, in this process, we must be prepared to 
engage in wider debatesincluding on human rights issues (1996:14). 
 
His counterpart at BP, John Browne, offers some additional clues as to the future 
social and environmental agenda of the oil industry: 
 
We need to go beyond analysis to seek solutions and to take action. It is a 
moment for change and for a re-thinking of corporate responsibility 
(1997:3). 
 
If market leaders like Shell and BP are serious about engaging in wider debates 
and rethinking corporate responsibility, then perhaps a time will come when the 
voices of those opposed to a potential project are more clearly heard. In such 
                                                     
7 The precautionary principle upholds the validity of taking action to protect the 
environment even in situations where scientific evidence regarding the cause and effects of 
environmental degradation is inconclusive. 
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cases, the most appropriate corporate response might be not to intervene at all. 
Whether oil companies are prepared to accept non-intervention as a possible 
solution in some cases remains to be seen.  
 
Postscript 
In July 1998, Shell announced that it would not go ahead with the Peru gas project, 
despite having spent US$ 250 million in exploration costs. The Economist 
reported that the Peruvian government and the oil companies could not resolve 
questions about distribution, pricing and exports. New drilling appraisals had also 
challenged original output forecasts. No mention was made of the possible role of 
civil society protest in Shells decision (1998a and b). 
 
Meanwhile, the situation in Nigerias Delta region remains tense. In October 1998, 
local protesters seized two Shell helicopters, and occupied an oil rig and more than 
10 oil relay stations. Local communities in Ogoni and other parts of the region 
continue to demand compensation from the Nigerian government, Shell and 
various other oil companies. MOSOPs financial demands remain fixed at US$ 30 
billion, the estimated value of Ogoni oil extracted since 1958. MOSOP also wants 
Shell to clean up degraded Ogoni lands. Although Shell has made overtures to 
individual community leaders in Ogoni, the company and MOSOP have been 
unable to resolve their differences. As of early 1999, Shells exile from Ogoni 
continues. Although some Shell pipelines continue to cross Ogoni territory, the 
company has not undertaken any drilling or gas flaring activities there since its 
withdrawal in 1993.  
 
Shells new development strategy for Nigeria includes a planned five-year 
investment of US$ 8.5 billion to develop a number of large off-shore oil fields. 
BBC reports suggest that part of the projects attraction is that off-shore 
development will be much less prone to the disruption which has severely 
affected output in the Niger delta (BBC Online, 1999). 
 
Just Do It·Justly! The Sporting Goods Industry, NGOs, Child 
Labour and Global Standards8 
 
The business response to sustainable development requires much more than 
policies and programmes for environmental protection. Social sustainability 
concerns such as poverty, health and child welfare are also affected both positively 
and negatively by commercial activities. At the international policy level, 
sustainable development encompasses environment, health and safety (EHS) issues 
in the workplace. In recent years, various United Nations agencies have lent 
impetus to calls for enhanced corporate environmental and social policy responses 
in both the North and the South. 
 
In the 1990s, the EHS practices of sporting goods companies such as Nike and 
Reebok, particularly in Asia, have been under attack by labour and human rights 
NGOs in both the North and South. For example, the Nike Fair-Play? Campaign 
has resulted in meetings between Dutch activists and Nike officials, at which the 
companys representatives admitted that the monitoring of its code of conduct was 
                                                     
8 This case study is based upon material published in a paper on corporate social 
responsibility prepared for the ILOs Conditions of Work and Welfare Facilities Branch 
(Murphy, 1997a). 
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unsatisfactory. Nikes main competitor, Reebok, has also faced scrutiny, with 
NGO accusations and media exposés about unfair wages, health and safety 
violations and the use of child and forced labour in some of its supplier factories in 
China.  
 
This case describes efforts by industry associations, member firms, manufacturers, 
United Nations agencies, NGOs and various local partners to develop strategies to 
prevent and eliminate the use of child labour in the production of hand-stitched 
soccer balls in Pakistan. The global soccer ball market is worth almost US$ 1 
billion in total retail sales. Pakistan produces about 80 per cent of the worlds 
match-grade soccer balls. 
 
The child labour issue 
In 1992, the International Labour Organization (ILO) established its International 
Programme for the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC), with the aim of working 
toward the progressive elimination of child labour. Through collaboration with a 
wide range of actors, IPEC seeks to prevent child labour, to withdraw children 
from hazardous work, to offer alternatives and, in the interim, to improve existing 
working conditions for children. 
 
Despite unprecedented public awareness of the problem . . . and broad consensus 
on the need to do something about it, the ILO notes: 
 
At the inter-governmental level, the problem of child labour has been 
caught up in a politically charged debate on human rights, labour 
standards, ethics and international trade. This partly accounts for the 
relatively slow progress being made towards concerted international 
action to tackle the problem, even in its most extreme forms (1997b:233). 
 
As of December 1997, less than 60 countries had ratified ILO Convention 138, an 
international agreement that sets minimum age standards for different kinds of 
work.9 
 
The State of the Worlds Children 1997 (a UNICEF report) focuses on child 
labour and makes links to global corporate irresponsibility. UNICEF cites the 
growing impact of a liberalized global economy driven by TNCs as a major 
contributor to the problem of exploitative child labour. Global competitive 
pressure brings children into the workforce in many Southern countries. Terry 
Collingsworth insists that government regulation on child labour needs to be 
safeguarded: 
 
The child labor issue should drive the larger struggle to regulate 
fundamental rights in the global economy. As nations lose their sovereign 
right to prohibit child labor (through stealth provisions in complex trade 
agreements), there must be a plan to ensure that the global economy does 
not force countries with reasonable child labor prohibitions to scrap those 
protections and offer up their children as a source of extra cheap labor in 
the global marketplace (1997:2). 
 
                                                     
9 Pakistan is a signatory to three of six ILO conventions related to child labour: No. 59 on 
Minimum Age (Industry), No. 29 on Forced Labour and No. 105 on the Abolition of Forced 
Labour (ILO, 1996). 
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Implementing social protection programmes on the ground, however, remains 
highly problematic. Despite the existence of national regulatory frameworks on 
child labour in many Southern countries, the weakness of enforcement 
mechanisms remains a major obstacle to effective legal protection largely due to 
the nature and scale of the problem (ILO, 1997b:241). Monitoring the use of 
child labour in the large informal sector is particularly difficult. 
 
The general United Nations message to governments and industry groups is that all 
extreme forms of child labour must end now. Rather than trying to stop child 
labour outright, consumers, companies and campaign groups are asked to target 
the intolerable and seek to eliminate all work which is detrimental to the health, 
safety and future development of children (ILO, 1996, 1997a; UNICEF, 1997). 
The ILO estimates that some 250 million children are currently working 
worldwide. 
 
A partnership response 
Officially launched in February 1997, the Project to Eliminate Child Labour in 
the Pakistan Soccer Ball Industry is a multi-stakeholder collaboration that 
primarily involves the following organizations, some as direct partners and others 
as project supporters: 
 
 Bunyad Literacy Community Council (BLCC): a Pakistani NGO that provides 
non-formal primary education mainly for girls and women.  
 International Labour Organization (ILO): a specialized United Nations agency 
with a tripartite structure, which allows for representation from governments, 
employer organizations and worker organizations. 
 Pakistan Bait-ul-Mal (PBM): an organization created by government statute 
which assists needy widows, orphans, people with disabilities, and the 
chronically ill, by providing them with assistance for education, housing and 
rehabilitation. 
 Save the Children-UK (SCF): the United Kingdoms largest international NGO 
concerned with childrens rights and welfare. SCF works in partnership with 
children, parents, governments, local authorities and NGOs in over 50 
countries. 
 Sporting Goods Manufacturers Association (SGMA): the trade association of 
North American manufacturers, producers and distributors of sports apparel, 
athletic footwear and sporting goods. 
 Sialkot Chamber of Commerce and Industry (SCCI): one of Pakistans largest 
and oldest association of business enterprises, based in the Sialkot District of 
Punjab Province. SCCI represents local soccer ball manufacturers. 
 United Nations Childrens Fund (UNICEF): a specialized United Nations 
agency dedicated exclusively to meet the needs of children. It works with other 
United Nations agencies, governments and NGOs to provide a range of health- 
and education-related community-based services. 
 World Federation of the Sporting Goods Industry (WFSGI): the Switzerland-
based association of national sporting goods manufacturers that together 
represent over 12,000 companies worldwide, including leading brands such as 
Nike, Reebok, Mitre, Adidas and Umbro. 
 
The partnership project has four main aims: 
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 to prevent and progressively eliminate child labour in the manufacture or 
assembly of soccer balls in Sialkot District and its environs; 
 to identify and remove children under the age of 14 in the manufacture or 
assembly of soccer balls and provide them with educational and other 
opportunities; 
 facilitate changes in community and family attitudes to child labour, including 
the soccer industry; and 
 to encourage the Government of Pakistan, the business community in Sialkot 
and other institutions to explore effective ways to eliminate child labour 
(quoted in SCF, 1997b:73). 
 
Two programmes are being developed to enable project participants to achieve 
these goals. First, the Prevention and Monitoring Programme is a voluntary 
scheme open to all soccer ball manufacturers. Participating firms are expected to 
meet formal registration requirements concerning use of contractors, stitching 
locations and proof-of-age documentation for workers. Second, the Social 
Protection Programme is designed to provide affected children and families with 
educational and financial support, and to raise local awareness about child labour 
and the need for alternatives.  
 
Project origins 
The roots of the Pakistan project lie in the emergence of child labour as a 
significant political and consumer issue in Northern countries in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. In 1992, US Senator Tom Harkin introduced a bill that would have 
placed import restrictions on products manufactured by child workers. Media 
coverage initially focused on large numbers of young girls employed in the 
Bangladesh garment industry and horrific cases of bonded child workers in the 
South Asian hand-woven carpet industry. One case proved to be particularly 
significant. Pakistani Iqbal Masih was sold into slavery in 1986, when he was only 
four years old, for less than US$ 16. After Masih escaped from a carpet factory in 
1992 he became a champion of child workers, spoke at international labour 
conferences and helped close dozens of Pakistani carpet factories. Over the course 
of his campaign Masih received numerous death threats and in early 1995 was shot 
dead in his home village. Although most independent evidence suggests that Masih 
was not killed by carpet industry assassins, his death and the outrage that followed 
drew worldwide attention to child labour and, in particular, to the situation in 
Pakistan (Associated Press, 1995; CEP, 1995; Marcus, 1997).  
 
The specific focus on the soccer ball industry originated in the United States in the 
aftermath of the locally hosted 1994 World Cup. The American Federation of 
Labour (AFL-CIO) had already been campaigning on the general issue of child 
labour since at least 1993. By focusing on child labour in the soccer ball industry, 
labour and consumer groups helped raise awareness about the issue with 
politicians, athletes, sports associations, parents, children and, perhaps most 
importantly, within the business community. 
 
In early 1995, WFSGI approached SCF with a proposal to develop a labelling 
scheme for soccer balls, similar to the Rugmark Foundations labelling scheme. 
Established in 1994 with the support of the ILO and a group of South Asian and 
European NGOs, Rugmark primarily targets European and North American 
importers and South Asian producers of handmade carpets. The scheme certifies 
participating producers according to a set of labour standards and related criteria. 
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Rugmark inspectors monitor factories on a regular basis. Child welfare NGOs are 
provided access to certified factories to ensure that children are not being 
employed. 
 
SCF declined the WFSGI offer, due to concerns that labelling would shift the 
focus away from the root causes of child labour in the industry. SCF worried that 
such schemes were more concerned with meeting the needs of Northern consumers 
rather than a direct response to the problems facing child workers. SCF feared that 
a labelling scheme might lead to an ethical labelled segment of the market, 
aimed at niche consumers, with the same companies continuing to market 
unlabelled, unethically produced products to other consumers. This would 
enable a participating company to be lauded for the ethical label without 
implementing ethical policies for all products and activities. Furthermore, SCF 
expressed doubts about potential monitoring problems. Rugmark was experiencing 
some difficulties in this regard (Hilowitz, 1997). 
 
Throughout 1995, the child labour story attracted increasingly attention from 
foreign journalists. In their efforts to get their story, some of these reporters were 
attacked and beaten up by local people in Sialkot, who feared the potential loss of 
income as a result of adverse publicity in the international media. Local 
manufacturers also complained that anti-child labour campaigns had an underlying 
agenda of promoting adult labour unions internationally.10 The news reports from 
Pakistan nonetheless continued to reach their intended audience, particularly in the 
United States.  
 
Near the end of 1995, in response to growing consumer and political pressure upon 
the soccer ball industry and individual companies, a new working committee 
within the WFSGI was established in co-operation with the International Olympic 
Committee (IOC). The new Committee on Ethics and Fair Trade was launched in 
early November at the first WFSGI conference on human rights, which was 
attended by representatives of the industry, United Nations agencies and NGOs. In 
the conference report, the new president of WFSGI, Stephen Rubin, admitted that 
WFSGI had been a passive organization frightened to upset its member 
associations and individual member companies, lest they cease to be members. It 
was time, Rubin argued, for the organization to become proactive, to stand up and 
be counted. He went on to say it is equally important that NGOs and other public 
sector organizations should back us up (WFSGI, 1996:1, 76).  
 
In early 1996, the FoulBall Campaign was launched in the United States by the 
International Labor Rights Fund (ILRF). The campaign targeted soccer balls 
originating from Pakistan, China and Indonesia and claimed that these countries 
use child labourers extensively. The campaign attracted support from average 
citizens and policy makers alike: 
 
[Y]outh soccer leagues in the U.S. were quick to pick up on it and join. 
The US Secretary of Labor, Robert Reich, was much interested in it and 
threw his influence into publicizing the effort, as did a number of 
members of the US Congress (Harvey, 1997). 
 
                                                     
10 Informal sector, home-based handstitching is notoriously hard to unionise, which may 
explain why many labour groups have campaigned against the use of child labour in soccer 
ball manufacturing (Marcus, 1997:1). 
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By mid-1996, coinciding with the UK-hosted European Cup of Football, the 
British Trade Union Congress, the International Textile, Garment and Leather 
Workers Federation and International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
launched an initiative with the Fédération Internationale de Football Association 
(FIFA) to target the soccer ball industry. The trade unionists were attempting to 
raise spectator awareness and to get FIFA to phase out the use of balls produced by 
child labour.  
 
Meanwhile, the FoulBall Campaign in North America was succeeding in getting 
its message across to the so-called soccer moms who were accompanying their 
children to the growing numbers of community soccer programmes. At Nikes 
1996 Annual General Meeting, Chairman Phil Knight acknowledged that the 
company had recently purchased a shipment of Pakistani soccer balls which were 
found to have been manufactured . . . using child labour in horrible conditions 
(Nando.net and Associated Press, 1996). In many respects, however, working 
conditions for most child stitchers in Sialkot were not as bad as those faced by 
child workers in other industries in Pakistan and elsewhere. Nonetheless, the 
soccer ball story continued to capture public attention largely because of its media-
friendly nature (Marcus, 1997). Consequently, the sporting goods industry 
continued to face growing consumer and activist pressure, particularly in North 
America and Western Europe. 
 
Seeking solutions 
In July 1996, representatives of Mitre, one of the largest soccer ball brands, 
organized a visit to Pakistan and invited SCF to accompany them. This visit 
enabled both Mitre and SCF to develop important contacts on the ground in the 
Sialkot District, where the Pakistan soccer ball industry is based. In particular, 
SCF initiated discussions with the local industry body (SCCI) about the need for 
complementary efforts to ensure that children removed from work do not find 
themselves in more dangerous and exploitative work environments. 
 
Mitre asked SCF to become involved in a monitoring and labelling scheme, but 
again SCF declined for reasons similar to those outlined above. However, SCF 
agreed to undertake a detailed study of the child labour issue in Sialkot. Although 
three other quantitative studies had already been done, few had gathered 
qualitative data and all lacked significant attention to the perspectives of children 
and their families. 
 
During the autumn of 1996, the soccer ball industry continued to feel the pressure 
of the various NGO campaigns. In September, the FIFA-labour group coalition 
mentioned above produced a broad and ambitious code of conduct that left the 
industry scrambling to respond. Trade associations such as WFSGI and the Soccer 
Industry Council of America (SICA) were increasingly concerned about the impact 
of NGO pressure upon the industrys image and the potential loss of markets. In an 
effort to help it find solutions to the growing storm of controversy, the WFSGI 
organized a conference in London in November 1996, bringing together industry 
representatives, many of its critics and other interested parties. 
 
At the conference, WFSGI announced that it was committed to developing a code 
of conduct for the production of all sporting goods. But the code failed to address 
the full range of labor rights enumerated in the FIFA code (Harvey, 1997). 
WFSGI also indicated that it had reached agreement with the Pakistan-based 
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Steering Committee on Child Labour (a joint initiative of SCCI and the All 
Pakistan Sporting Goods Association) to develop a programme to help eliminate 
the use of child labour in the soccer ball industry. Another outcome of the 
conference was that SCF agreed to undertake a detailed situational analysis in 
Sialkot, re-affirming its original commitment made during the Mitre visit.  
 
Partnership agreement signed 
Following the London conference, formal negotiations continued between WFSGI, 
ILO, UNICEF and SCCI in order to finalize a joint project response to the child 
labour issue. This culminated in the formal announcement in Atlanta on 14 
February 1997 of the Project to Eliminate Child Labour in the Pakistan Soccer Ball 
Industry. Although the official Partners Agreement to Eliminate Child Labour in 
the Soccer Ball Industry was signed only by ILO, UNICEF and SCCI, SCF was 
invited to become a full partner on the Project Co-ordinating Committee. At the 
Atlanta launch, the WFSGI, SICA and Sporting Goods Manufacturers Association 
(SGMA) were identified as project facilitators. FIFA and the US Youth Soccer 
Association were listed as project supporters. FoulBall criticized the Partners 
Agreement as an industry attempt to pre-empt legislation and truly independent 
monitoring (ILRF, 1997:1). 
 
After the project launch, SCF began field research in Sialkot. The major purpose 
of the four-week study was to provide SCF and other organizations with a reliable 
baseline before introducing social protection programmes to assist children 
displaced from football stitching. SCF decided to participate in the partnership 
because it was concerned that emotive responses in the past have caused more 
harm than good, with banned child labourers often forced to take on harmful, 
less well paid work, including prostitution. SCF wanted to ensure that 
sustainable solutions would be developed to help overcome poverty, a root cause 
of child labour (SCF, 1997a:1). In particular, SCF was worried about the loss of 
family income as a result of the decision to eliminate the use of child stitchers. 
This explains why SCF remains opposed to blanket bans on child labour. On a 
more strategic level, SCFs motivation for participating in the Pakistan project was  
 
. . . to use [its] experience of child labour programmes elsewhere in a 
constructive partnership with the private sectora new experience for 
[SCF]. . . .[SCF] also saw this as an opportunity to link work at the micro 
levelin Sialkotwith macro level lobbying and advocacy on corporate 
social responsibility, [an area of increasing involvement] in the UK 
(Marcus, 1997:23). 
 
Between March and April 1997, the ILO undertook a mission to Pakistan in its 
capacity as lead agency on the project. One of the major ILO tasks was to finalize 
the Partners Operational Framework. The only major change to the original terms 
of reference concerned the issue of independent third-party monitoring in the 
Prevention and Monitoring Programme. In response to concerns expressed by the 
SCCI about third-party monitoring, the partners agreed to designate the ILO as 
external monitor. The SCCI was mainly concerned that the expense involved in 
hiring a commercial auditor would be excessive for local manufacturers to bear. 
The SCCI also felt that the ILO had the capacity and experience to fulfil the role. 
In particular, the SCCI pointed to recent ILO monitoring and verification 
experience in Bangladesh. Since 1995, the ILO has been working with 
Government of Bangladesh, UNICEF and the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers 
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and Exporters Association (BGMEA) to remove underage children from BGMEA 
factories and to place them in appropriate education programmes. 
 
The Partners Operational Framework was agreed in late June 1997. In addition to 
providing operational definitions, immediate objectives, long-term goals and 
specific project elements, the framework outlines the proposed roles of the on-the-
ground partners. Furthermore, it specifies the implementation guidelines and 
successor arrangements for sustainability.  
 
The overall project is being managed by the Project Co-ordinating Committee, in 
which the SCCI, ILO, UNICEF and SCF are represented. Project partner 
representatives on the ground have formed the Sialkot Implementation Team to 
facilitate co-ordination between the two general programme areas and individual 
components within these programmes. 
 
The SCCI, ILO and participating local manufacturers are implementing the 
Prevention and Monitoring Programme. As noted above, the ILO is responsible for 
external monitoring and verification, whereas local manufacturers carry out 
internal monitoring. The SCCI is expected to communicate progress achieved to its 
members and also to raise member awareness about their roles and responsibilities 
in the prevention of child labour. The ILO, UNICEF, SCCI, SCF, PBM, and BLCC 
are implementing the Social Protection Programme. The Board of the PBM has 
made a commitment to assume responsibility for the continuation of the 
programme upon its estimated completion date in 1999. 
 
As of December 1997, the project was under way, with SCF having formed a 
partnership with the National Rural Support Programme, a Pakistani NGO that will 
implement related social mobilization activities and a credit and savings scheme. 
In order to protect womens jobs and family incomes, the SCF is also organizing 
groups of women stitchers into units that will be inspected by ILO-trained child 
labour monitors. Furthermore, the SCF has initiated a social monitoring 
component to provide detailed tracking of the impact of the overall programme 
upon local families and communities (Marcus, 1997). 
 
More hurdles ahead 
The project partners have made substantial financial and in-kind commitments to 
date. For organizations such as the ILO and SCF, there are important questions 
about their capacity to respond to demands for similar partnerships in other 
industrial sectors around the world. This raises concerns about both the 
sustainability and replicability of such elaborate and ambitious monitoring and 
verification schemes, not to mention the vital social protection programmes. There 
are also questions about the capacity of the partners in Pakistan to provide the 
necessary financial support for the long-term needs of the project and its 
beneficiaries. For local communities and industries dependent upon the 
preferences of global consumers, such projects bring hope for the future but leave 
many socio-economic and political issues unresolved. Many Pakistanis continue to 
challenge anti-child labour campaigns by suggesting that their underlying aim is to 
destroy foreign competition and protect Northern jobs. There is nevertheless a 
feeling among some members of the Pakistani middle class that global child labour 
standards are needed and that intellectual arguments to the contrary should be 
challenged (Marcus, 1997). 
 
30 
UNRISD Discussion Paper No. 109 
The most important lesson for other industry sectors appears to be the fundamental 
importance of corporate transparency and a willingness to accept independent 
monitoring. The credibility of the Pakistan partnership depends upon ongoing 
NGO support, both in the North and in Pakistan. The active role of the ILO in the 
monitoring programme also offers hope that United Nations agencies may be able 
to assume new governance roles as arbiters of global corporate standards. The 
SCFs leadership on the ground and through its advocacy work at home suggests 
that Northern-based development NGOs can play a significant role in promoting 
global corporate responsibility for sustainable development. 
 
Meanwhile, various companies within the sporting goods industry continue to face 
the scrutiny of civil society everywhere. Despite its support for the Pakistan 
initiative, Nike remains a major target of protest. When former United States 
Ambassador to the United Nations Andrew Young, on behalf of Good Works 
International, reviewed Nike factories in China, Indonesia and Viet Nam in mid-
1997, his findings were mixed. Young found no evidence of systematic abuse or 
mistreatment of workers, yet he discovered that most workers knew little about 
their rights or Nikes code of conduct (quoted in Himelstein, 1997:44). 
Furthermore, he called on the company to introduce a comprehensive third-party 
independent monitoring system because of the prevalence of absentee factory 
owners and limited Nike on-site supervisors. Although some of Youngs 
recommendations echo the demands of many campaign groups, the response of 
company critics has not been positive. Global Exchange called the report 
meaningless as it avoided any consideration of wages, what may be the most 
important concern of Nikes foreign workers (ibid.).  
 
In late 1997, FoulBalls Internet Web site claimed that Nike and other industry 
players continued to demonstrate foot dragging, deliberate confusion and no 
strong leadership in Pakistan and elsewhere. FoulBall suggested that only the 
potential for a World Cup boycott [in 1998] seems to be seriously getting the 
attention of the industry (ILRF, 1997:2). At the same time, action also depends 
upon the on-the-ground leadership of the Pakistani industry. SCFs Rachel Marcus 
(1997) has argued that long-term success will depend upon local ownership.  
 
Despite some forward movement on the child labour issue in the Pakistan soccer 
ball industry, the bottom line for many critics is that Northern-based sporting 
goods companies continue to promote double standards. Whether one is talking 
about EHS standards in the workplace or wider environmental impacts, companies 
such as Nike continue to source goods from the South that are often produced 
under conditions that would be unacceptable and often illegal in most Northern 
countries. The end result is that people and their environments are often 
inadequately protected, particularly in the South. Pakistani families who depend 
upon their childrens income, however, remain concerned about the consequences 
of eliminating child labour altogether. In the words of a father of child stitchers: It 
is not good for children to work, but if they dont, how shall we live? (quoted in 
SCF, 1997b:26). 
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TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF 
BUSINESS-NGO RELATIONS  
 
One of the goals of this paper is to offer a clearer understanding of why and how 
business-NGO relations on sustainable development have begun to change in 
recent years. It is hoped that this will promote new thinking about the future role 
of corporations in the sustainable development of the South. As noted earlier, 
research on the specific area of business-NGO relations on sustainable 
development has, until recently, been limited. The literature on environmental 
management, civil society, conflict theory, public-private partnerships and inter-
organizational collaboration offers important insights of relevance to this 
discussion. Recent action-oriented research on business-environmental group 
partnerships presents additional useful perspectives. Before considering what the 
three case studies reveal about the characteristics of business-NGO relations, we 
review briefly some of these theoretical perspectives. 
 
 Theoretical Perspectives on Business-NGO Relations 
 
Despite the growing prominence of the idea of business-NGO partnership, 
environmental and socio-economic conflicts continue to dominate the global, 
national and local political landscapes. With reference to the United States, Denise 
Lach notes that environmental conflict appears to be increasing exponentially, 
with most communities facing difficult choices and decisions related to cleanup, 
restoration, preservation [and/or] management (1996:211). Lach describes 
multiple sources of conflict: 
 
Conflict arises when interests about resource allocation diverge as they 
inherently do in our heterogeneous society. Conflict arises when those 
who benefit from the status quo are challenged by those who seek change. 
And conflict arises when affected stakeholders differ on their definitions 
of the problem. . . . [E]nvironmental decision making exists at the 
junction of science, politics and economics, each with its own criteria for 
distributing resources (1996:212). 
 
Rather than seeing conflict as an obstacle to sustainable development, many social 
scientists would agree that it is a central feature of political and social processes: 
 
[N]ot only is conflict always with us, it contains the seeds of beneficial 
change as well as destructive consequences. Contrary to the common view 
that conflict is always a negative force that must be managed to 
resolution, conflict can be a driving force for social change. . . . 
Fundamentally, conflict forces all of us to clarify and adapt our 
perspectives in response to changing human interests and environmental 
conditions (Lach, 1996:212). 
 
As agents of conflict and controversy, radical activist groups have been reviled as 
naïve and dangerous proponents of extreme positions (Lewis, 1995:250). 
However, the absence of such a critical voice can also be a potential impediment to 
sustainable development. The confrontational tactics of radical environmentalism 
play an essential role in identifying the need to change the unsustainable nature of 
global industrial society: 
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[T]he words and deeds of radical environmentalists today may be a 
window to the future state of the world. And to the chagrin of those who 
now control the Earths ecology, whether that window shows a living 
green world or a wasteland may very likely depend on the success or 
failure of radical environmentalism (Manes, 1990:12). 
 
Despite what Christopher Manes describes as a surly symbiosis between radical 
and moderate environmentalists, even Earth First! founder Dave Foreman 
acknowledges that less radical groups and methods are needed (Manes, 1990:19).  
 
Although the idea of partnership has a long history in the world of business, there 
has been limited theoretical work to date related to business-NGO partnerships. 
Social science researchers have examined public-private or social partnerships in 
the United Kingdom and the United States (Waddock, 1988; Mackintosh, 1992; 
Bailey, 1994). Others have looked at the general field of inter-organizational 
collaboration (Gray, 1989; Gray and Wood, 1991; Wood and Gray, 1991). In terms 
of broader societal issues, Riane Eisler envisions a new integrated partnership 
politics that factors in matters that have been largely ignored in most analyses of 
how to move to a humane future (1996:565).  
 
Even less work has been carried out on the specific area of business-NGO 
partnerships for sustainable development. To redress this gap, a small but growing 
body of action-oriented, generally non-academic research on business-NGO 
environmental partnerships has begun to emerge in recent years from which four 
broadly different partnership typologies can be identified: 
 
McKinsey and Co. (1992): In its work for the United States Presidents 
Commission on Environmental Quality, McKinsey and Co. proposed a way of 
analysing partnerships according to their intended impact on regulation. They 
attempted to determine whether partnerships pre-empt, inform or respond to 
environmental legislation. Despite its legislative focus, their framework did not 
consider how partnerships might result from disenchantment with the legislative or 
regulatory process. 
 
Frederick Long and Mathew Arnold (1995): In their work for the Management 
Institute for Environment and Business (MEB), Long and Arnold identified four 
types of environmental partnerships: 
 Pre-emptive partnerships attempt to defuse an already or potentially 
confrontational situation.  
 Coalescing partnerships bring together traditional rivals with different 
motivations but shared goals that can be achieved together.  
 Exploration partnerships attempt to research issues of joint concern.  
 Leverage partnerships are initiatives that aim to pool resources to allow 
partners to reap higher returns than would be gained alone after modest 
investments of time and money, similar to the partnering approach in the 
business world. 
 
SustainAb ity (1996): In its strategic review of British Petroleums relationships 
with environmental NGOs (ENGOs), SustainAbility outlined nine types of 
company-ENGO relationships based on the degree of commonality in goals 
between actors. Business-NGO relations range from those where there is no 
il
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commonality (challenge) to those characterized by high commonality (strategic 
joint venture). In between, there is a range of types including sparring partner, 
charitable support, and strategy dialogue. This approach provides business 
leaders with analytical tools to better understand existing and future relations with 
NGOs. 
 
Murphy and Bendell (1997): In our book In the Company of Partners, we offer 
three models of business-NGO partnership where NGOs attempt to influence 
business policy or operational issues: 
 Process-oriented partnerships involve NGOs with internal company 
management processes in some way. They often focus on broad issues such as 
environmental policies, eco-efficiency strategies or improving the performance 
of suppliers. 
 Project-oriented partnerships focus on discrete projects to achieve objectives 
with significant implications for core business practice. They differ from 
process partnerships, as the relationship does not necessarily involve NGOs 
with internal management decisions. 
 Product-oriented partnerships involve NGOs in specific product development 
and/or endorsement. The difference between these partnerships and process-
oriented initiatives is that they do not involve the NGO with internal company 
management decisions. Unlike project-oriented partnerships, they focus on 
delivering improvements in products or product sales. 
 
Together the above frameworks describe a range of existing business-NGO 
relationships, including those involving other actors. Although the SustainAbility 
typology describes a larger number of interactions, neither it nor any of the others 
fully explains the diversity of business-NGO relations on sustainable development. 
Most, if not all of the typologies, are very Northern-centric and fail to consider the 
contingent relationship between conflict and partnership. They also appear to be 
more concerned with the nature of the relationships and the benefits accruing to 
the partners rather than considering the extent to which business-NGO 
relationships affect the inter-organizational problem domain of sustainable 
development. In this regard, there are related questions about the extent to which 
business-NGO partnerships actually embody sustainable development principles. 
Furthermore, most of the research to date fails to explore the wider implications of 
closer and more collaborative business-NGO relationships, namely for democracy, 
governance, regulation and global social change.  
 
CONCLUSIONS: THE CHARACTERISTICS 
OF COLLABORATION 
 
Researchers such as Donna Wood and Barbara Gray (1991) argue for a 
comprehensive theory of collaboration. However, it should be remembered that 
partnerships are highly contextually specific . . . [and] must be developed within 
the political and organizational culture of specific localities (Stewart and Snape, 
1996:5). The more specific area of business-NGO partnerships for sustainable 
development embodies a wide range of industrial sectors, NGO types, 
geographical contexts, political cultures and organizational forms. Given this 
diversity, it seems unlikely that any one model of collaboration would be an 
adequate, let alone appropriate, analytical tool. Instead we offer some general 
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characteristics of business-NGO collaboration, which, for the most part, appear to 
be shared by all three case studies. These characteristics are presented as 
preconditions for interactive processes and outcomes. 
 
 Preconditions 
 
It is important to understand the factors that give rise to partnerships, namely the 
preconditions that motivate organizations to seek out partners or to accept offers to 
collaborate (Gray and Wood, 1991). These may include external and/or internal 
issues unique to one organization or shared by the partners. The specific origins of 
the formal partnerships and other collaborative forms of business-relations in each 
of the case studies are obviously unique. Below we offer a preliminary list of 
partnership preconditions that emerge from the case studies and other research. It 
is not exhaustive and should not be seen as a partnership formula. Relevant 
preconditions include the following: 
 
 emergence of sustainable development as a newalbeit contestedglobal-
local problem domain where both business and NGOs are relevant 
stakeholders; 
 perceived and actual decline in the effectiveness of state regulation and global 
governance related to the enforcement of environmental and labour standards; 
 acknowledgement on the part of NGOs of the increasing political and economic 
power of global corporations as agents of unsustainable development and as 
potentially positive agents of socio-economic and environmental change; 
 proliferation of North-South double standards in corporate social and 
environmental policies and programmes; 
 impact of different forms of sustained, often widespread NGO campaigning, 
including direct action, consumer awareness and information dissemination via 
new technologies, upon corporate reputation, market position and business 
responses to sustainable development; 
 recognition by beleaguered companies of the growing power and legitimacy of 
NGOs as agents of social change and potential partners to help solve business 
problems; 
 need for more inclusive and accountable models of society, governance, 
problem solving, standard setting, regulation, community development, etc.; 
 
 Interactive Processes 
 
Another aspect of understanding the business-NGO partnership phenomenon is to 
consider the various interactive processes that take place as part of the 
development and implementation of such initiatives in different contexts. These 
may include interactions within the organizational boundaries of the partnership 
concerned, as well as external influences. The following list is not a definitive 
checklist for the business-NGO partnership process, but rather initial perceptions 
based upon the case studies and other relevant material. 
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Interactive processes include the following: 
 
 capacity and willingness of partners to cope with the diverse perspectives and 
paradoxical goals from the outset and throughout the process; 
 commitment of partners to principles of shared responsibility, mutual symbiosis 
and joint ownership; 
 articulation of honest and realistic expectations by partners; 
 development of a flexible structure consistent with the purpose and functioning 
of the partnership; 
 organizational commitment of business partner(s) to change unsustainable 
practices through specific policies, concrete actions and ongoing support for the 
partnership; 
 ability of NGO partner to maintain organizational independence and integrity;  
 ongoing pressure from other NGOs and activists related to the problem domain; 
 capability of business and NGO partner(s) to respond appropriately to such 
ongoing pressure; 
 capacity to broaden partnership scope and participation in some cases to 
include relevant UN and governmental agencies (e.g., Pakistan); 
 ongoing tensions between businesses and NGOs about the potentials and limits 
of partnership in different geographical, political, social and cultural contexts. 
 Outcomes and Consequences 
 
A third general way of understanding business-NGO partnership is to consider 
their outcomes and consequences. Gray and Wood suggest that partnership 
outcomes can be identified by considering whether problems were solved . . . 
whose problems were solved . . . whether shared norms were achieved and 
whether the partnership survived (1991:18). Another way of reviewing 
partnerships would be to consider some of the wider implications of closer and 
more collaborative business-NGO relationships. Given that most of the examples 
cited are still evolving and the newness of this specific area of study, the following 
list of partnership outcomes offers a tentative picture of an emerging phenomenon: 
 
 partnering NGOs are gaining greater credibility as important resources for both 
business and society; 
 some partnering businesses are being recognized for their more proactive 
approaches to social and environmental matters; 
 other NGO and consumer pressure on partnering businesses and/or industry 
sectors does not necessarily end and is often maintained; 
 shared norms are emerging around the general idea of sustainable development 
although it remains a contested and controversial problem domain; 
 many specific problem areas addressed by business-NGO partnerships remain 
complex and multi-faceted, and therefore require ongoing dialogue and 
negotiation in order to identify medium- and long-term solutions. 
 
Seen from a wider perspective, business-NGO partnerships constitute part of a 
changing global political and economic context which is giving rise to new models 
of corporate accountability and stakeholder engagement. This context is 
characterized by a number of international developments including the 
globalization of business, trade and finance; advances in communications 
technologies; and a growth in the number of NGOs and the scope of their 
activities. Many would argue that this context also includes unacceptable yet 
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deepening levels of environmental degradation and human poverty. The perceived 
and actual decline in the role of the state in the face of globalization raises 
additional concerns about governance and regulatory gaps nationally and globally. 
We should remember that stories of NGO-driven corporate environmentalism are 
fresh straws of hope in a rotten haystack of unaccountable and irresponsible global 
capitalism. The unsustainable reality for billions of people on Earth today 
nonetheless compels us to grasp at these straws, as potential catalysts for more 
sustainable and equitable world futures. This is our reason for venturing a new 
theory of corporate environmentalism based upon civil regulation.  
 
PART 2: TOWARD CIVIL REGULATION 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
What is corporate environmentalism, really? What can it offer the many people in 
less industrialized countries, today and tomorrow, who seek secure and sustainable 
livelihoods? Is the idea of growing business responsibility for the environment of 
developing countries our common future, or our shared fallacy? Some observers 
stress that it is largely a public relations exercise or greenwash, so that 
companies can continue to plunder the planet. Others have insisted that it is a real 
and rational business response to ecological constraints and market opportunities. 
The rational business response argument suggests that self-compliance is an 
adequate strategy for sustainability. The greenwash argument demands greater 
legal compliance from business if we are to reverse environmental degradation. 
These diametrically opposed analyses have generated much heated debate on the 
issues of sustainable development, corporate regulation and global governance. 
 
In contrast, the changing business response to NGOs, described in part 1, cannot 
be adequately explained by either side of this debate. Corporations are increasingly 
being compelled to take action by civil society, not by government. These 
phenomena are examples of neither self-compliance nor legal compliance, and the 
evidence we have presented contributes neither to the rational business response 
argument nor the greenwash argument. However, it is important to remember 
that the instances of NGO-driven business responsibility for sustainable 
development are limited in both number and geographical scope. As in nearly all 
cases the force for change has come from well-financed Northern NGOs; the 
potential role of NGO-driven corporate environmentalism in the South is currently 
unclear. 
 
Part 2 investigates the potential for the wider replication of NGO-driven corporate 
environmentalism in developing countries. This is done by placing the initiatives 
described above within the context of global processes, including the globalization 
of business, trade and finance, and advances in communications technologies. This 
leads us to develop a theory of how corporations are regulated for social and 
environmental goals in a globalizing economy and to chart appropriate corporate, 
NGO and governmental strategies. 
 
Our argument is this. First, corporate responsibility for environmental protection is 
a political process. This is not to dismiss the commercial win-win arguments for 
environmental management, which are now well established. Instead, we point out 
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that many environmental management initiatives go beyond eco-efficiencies and 
tackle issues where financial outlay does not generate immediate returns. Second, 
civil society organizations are increasingly important actors in determining the 
political-economic context within which business must operate. These very diverse 
organizations, called NGOs, are linking globally through communications 
technology and are able to generate ethical responses from consumers. Third, the 
emergence of consumer politics and the growth of these NGOs is allowing a new 
model of regulation to develop. While the rational business response and 
greenwash analyses suggest policies of either self-compliance or legal 
compliance respectively, our analysis leads us to describe the phenomenon of 
civil complianceor what we will call civil regulation. 
 
THE POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF 
CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTALISM 
 
The Gramscian concept of hegemony is one theoretical framework which can be 
used to analyse the politics of corporate environmentalism. Antonio Gramsci 
(1988) argued that in most societies there is a coalition of groups that dominates 
social, political and economic expression. This coalition of business, government, 
professional and intellectual elites is interested in protecting the status quo and is 
therefore constantly managing and incorporating opposition to its hegemonic 
control. Accordingly, if levels of environmental degradation become socially 
unacceptable and engender civil protest, then industry and other hegemonic groups 
must respond to maintain confidence in the current political-economic system. 
 
Employing this framework David Levy (1997) argues that most environmental 
management is an exercise in political, not environmental, sustainability. Levy 
draws upon evidence that much environmental management cannot be explained 
on a purely financial basis. Rather, environmental initiatives, projects and codes of 
conduct go further than narrow eco-efficiencies and therefore have a strong 
stakeholder relationsor politicalelement. This is environmental management 
as corporate responsibility. For example, environmental consultants at McKinsey 
and Co. believe win-win situations . . . are very rare and will likely be 
overshadowed by the total cost of a companys environmental program (Walley 
and Whitehead, 1994:46). In addition, research in a Northern context shows that 
corporate environmentalism is primarily motivated by regulatory and public 
pressure rather than opportunities for financial savings, competitive advantage or 
green premiums (Ashford, 1993; Dillon and Fischer, 1992; Rappaport and 
Flaherty, 1992).  
 
The industry response to tropical deforestation described in part 1 demonstrates a 
political motivation for corporate environmentalism. Although there is a strong 
business case for ensuring future supplies of timber, and therefore the conservation 
of productive forests, the commercial pressures posed by NGOs, such as boycotts, 
were more immediate and therefore more significant. 
 
Similarly, developments in the oil industry suggest that the political motivation for 
environmental management is becoming more widely recognized by company 
managers. Since the Brent Spar and Nigeria episodes, Shells president wants the 
company to replace its technological arrogance with a more co-operative 
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approach, which recognizes that environmental issues are social and political 
dilemmas with a range of possible answers (Herkströter, 1996:9). Similarly the 
chairman of BP now believes that societys concern about global warming 
provides enough justification for action, even though there may be ongoing 
scientific disagreements about its causes and consequences (Browne, 1997). 
Whereas in the past a faith in science and certainty governed business decisions, 
the emerging approach of senior management in oil, timber and other international 
companies is to put people in the centre of the debate and therefore acknowledge 
the political nature of corporate environmentalism.  
 
This political dimension to environmental management is reflected in the emerging 
emphasis on stakeholder management and the concept of social capital. The theory 
of stakeholder management says that companies can only succeed if they pay 
attention to all those who affect or are affected by the companys operations. This 
includes customers, staff, shareholders, suppliers, interest groups, local 
communities and regulators. Depending on the scale and impact of the business, 
even the entire population of planet Earth may be seen as stakeholders in a 
company (Wheeler and Sillanpaa, 1997).  
 
Whether it is the primary purpose of a business to satisfy its stakeholders or only 
to do this in order to maintain dividends for shareholders is widely disputed. 
Supporters of the former position generally recognize the importance of social 
capitala valuation put on the business benefits of stakeholder management, 
such as trust and motivation. Francis Fukuyama (1995) believes the economic 
value of trust is considerable and should be valued in the same way as other capital 
assets. Social capital is therefore a valuation of the ability of people in groups and 
organizations to work together for common purposes. 
 
Many individuals involved in the business-NGO partnerships described earlier 
champion stakeholder consultation as a sound way of finding socially acceptable 
solutions to sustainable development issues and, therefore, of protecting social 
capital. Senior managers from wood product retailers have committed their 
companies to meeting targets and implementing policies largely defined by WWF-
UK. Executives at both Shell and BP have sought political and technical advice 
from many of their critics in their efforts to revise company policies and 
operational guidelines.  
 
Many of the participants in business-NGO partnerships are known to the authors 
personally, and we can say that a fresh sense of purpose and optimism surrounds 
their partnership activities. However, stepping back from the specific initiatives, 
some commentators voice a concern with the political implications of what is 
occurring. From the Gramscian perspective mentioned earlier, Levy (1997) argues 
that the political nature of corporate environmentalism is worrisome. The concern 
is that political expediency rather than environmental necessity determines 
environmental management. This produces a business-first attitude to 
environmental and social problems, which often undermines more fundamental 
approaches to environmental sustainability: 
 
[Corporate environmentalism] can be understood as an integrated 
response on the practical and ideological levels that serves to deflect more 
radical challenges to the hegemonic coalition (Levy 1997:127). 
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The deflection of more radical approaches to environmental management is an 
issue that is addressed by Richard Welford (1997). Eco-modernism, he argues, is 
becoming the dominant industry discourse on the environment, and it treats the 
environment as another technological problem to be overcome in the pursuit of 
progress. To the eco-modernist, pollution is an economic opportunity for 
prevention and clean-up technologies and certainly not an indication of 
fundamental problems with the current economic system.  
 
Levy and Welford may take different approaches, but they arrive at the same 
conclusionthat corporate environmentalism embodies a strong political element. 
Levy believes environmental management to be an overtly political process, as 
most companies actively go beyond eco-efficiency and deal with community and 
stakeholder issues. Welford believes environmental managements narrow focus 
on eco-efficiency marginalizes more comprehensive and ambitious sustainability 
management approaches.  
 
We agree that environmental management is becoming a more political process, 
but not only because of business attempts at better stakeholder relations or because 
more radical discourses are being undermined. We believe that civil society 
organizations are also playing significant roles in promoting environmental and 
social management (Murphy and Bendell, 1997). The evidence of anti-logging, 
anti-oil and anti-child labour protests illustrates that NGOs are increasingly setting 
the political agenda within which business must work. The challenge is therefore 
to seize the opportunities afforded by corporate environmental politics, not lament 
its existence. The next section describes the ways in which NGOs are playing this 
increasingly political role.  
 
NGOs AND THE POLITICS OF PRESSURE 
IN A GLOBALIZING ECONOMY 
 
The increasing size, notoriety and apparent uncontrollability of transnational 
corporations (TNCs) coupled with the spread of information technology are 
leading to a new NGO-driven politics of pressure. In recent years NGOs, in both 
the North and South, have focused increasingly on the activities of TNCs and the 
sensitivities of consumers to ethical concerns. This development is the result of a 
number of factors, which we describe below. 
 
The first dynamic is the emergence of the global economy and the perceived 
decline in the role of the nation state. The 1990s have seen the rapid development 
of global money markets. Private investment in the developing world spiralled 
from 44 billion dollars in 1990 to over 167 billion dollars in 1995 (World Bank, 
1996). During the same period, official development assistance (ODA) fell 
slightly, to a total of 59 billion by 1995 (OECD-DAC, 1996). Today private money 
is influencing the levels of environmental protection in the South as much as, if not 
more than, ODA. 
 
From an environmental perspective, how the hundreds of billions of 
private capital are spent matters far more than how the few billion dollars 
of official assistance devoted to environmental investments gets dispensed 
(Esty and Gentry, 1997:2). 
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The globalization of trade and finance may be proceeding apace, but the 
globalization of governance is not. As capital and industry become increasingly 
large and mobile, the power of many national governments to set their own policy 
agenda has weakened (Korten, 1995; Camilleri and Falk, 1992). In a global 
market, if a TNC does not favour the policies of a particular government it may 
choose to locate elsewhere, particularly if the country in question has a relatively 
small internal market. These types of investment decisions by TNCs are 
increasingly important, as they control 33 per cent of the worlds productive assets 
(UNRISD, 1995). If the international money markets anticipate a withdrawal by a 
number of TNCs, then confidence in a countrys economic performance and 
therefore its currency may decline, leading to an economic downturn. 
Consequently governments have been involved in a process of competitive 
deregulation. 
 
The second dynamic relates to the role that some major corporations are beginning 
to assume in the psyche of people in developed and developing countries. With 
global expansion, certain brands have become well known throughout the world. A 
brand image is an aggregate of the thoughts customers or investors associate with a 
particular company symbol, from a product logo to a stock market listing. Brand 
image has become so important that changes to it can have significant effects on 
company profitability or value. Environmental and social issues hold both positive 
and negative potentials for companies with global brand images. Meanwhile, many 
NGOs carry public opinion with them on environmental and social issues, which 
means they have the ability to affect corporate brand image in these areas. 
 
A third dynamic is the development in telecommunications and information 
technology. The types of protests described in part 1 remind us that information 
dissemination is crucial in allowing the development of NGO pressure politics. 
Global access to computers, fax machines, modems, satellite communications, 
solar powered battery packs and hand-held video cameras has provided many civil 
society groups with greater knowledge, voice and power. Although the vast 
majority of the worlds poor and powerless do not have direct access to 
information technology, growing numbers of NGOs and activist groups do. The 
flow of information around the world during political uprisings and following the 
disappearances or murders of notable campaigners lends added political weight to 
these events. Thanks to cyberspace, absolute control over information access is 
no longer possible and atrocities can no longer be covered up easily (Johnston, 
1997:336). Gramsci (1988) argued that hegemonic power is maintained as much 
by manufacturing consent through the media as it is by coercion or force. Absolute 
control over information is one of the keys to controlling thought and behaviour, as 
information influences and shapes cultural belief systems and legitimizes political 
authority. From this perspective, the communications revolution is fundamental to 
the power of civil society. 
 
In the North, lack of government capacity and will to effect change, coupled with 
the iconic nature of major corporations and the communications revolution, are 
providing NGOs with added reasons to focus on corporate practice. This change in 
strategy is part of third wave environmentalism for environmental NGOs and the 
social market movement for development NGOs (Murphy and Bendell, 1997). 
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In the South, NGOs have also begun to focus on the market. There are similar 
reasons for this change in focus. First, in many countries progress through 
lobbying their own governments has been difficult, whether they are democratic or 
not. The pressures of foreign debt and structural adjustment programmes often 
limit the scope of governments to act on ethical issues such as environmental 
protection and fair pay. Second, intergovernmental agencies have been slow to act, 
disillusioning groups in the South in the same way as is happening in the North. 
Third, Northern NGOs have begun to reach out to Southern groups and involve 
them in new market-oriented campaigns. For example, the World Development 
Movement in the United Kingdom often sponsors and organizes visits by Southern 
campaigners. These initiatives are facilitated by the communications technologies 
mentioned above. 
 
Focusing on corporations and the market is also natural to many Southern 
campaigners. Many are fighting for economic justice as well as environmental 
justice, and have identified the activities of certain corporations as the problem 
from the outset. The MOSOP campaign against Shell in Nigeria is one example of 
a Southern movement that linked environmental degradation, economic hardship 
and social exclusion as negative outcomes of irresponsible business behaviour. 
This presentation allowed the campaign to appeal to activists, as well as Shells 
customers and investors, in Europe. The focus on markets is also illustrated by the 
international campaign of the Tupinikim and Guarani. Fearing that the Brazilian 
government would be swayed by the financial pressures and opportunities 
associated with a decision on Aracruz Cellulose access to indigenous lands, the 
Indians have appealed to European markets for support.  
 
Given increasing concern with and ability to affect market behaviour, civil society 
organizations have developed a number of tools to change corporate policy. This is 
leading to new forms of market-oriented activity by NGOs, activist and community 
groups. Consequently there is now a wider spectrum of relations between 
companies and NGOs, from direct action protest to dialogue and partnership.  
 
One of the best known market-oriented NGO tactics is the corporate boycott. 
Boycotts of sports goods companies such as Nike, timber retailers such as B&Q 
and oil companies such as Shell have prompted companies to take seriously the 
ethical concerns of the public. Growing NGO support for ethical investment, 
where investments are screened against social and environmental criteria, is also a 
form of systematic boycotting of unethical company shares. Although these 
tactics have worldwide implications, they do not appear to be a viable option for 
NGOs in countries where consumer and investment power is less influential.  
 
A second confrontational tactic of NGOs is direct action protest, where groups 
deliberately sabotage the commercial operations of a company. In the South, the 
forest peoples of the Oriente in Ecuador have, on numerous occasions, blocked the 
building of new roads by the oil company ARCO (Collinson, 1996). In the North, 
activist attendance at annual shareholder meetings to demonstrate or table 
controversial motions is another form of direct action protest, which has affected 
companies such as Shell. 
 
A third tactic is collaboration, as evidenced in the partnership initiatives described 
above, in the oil, timber and sports goods industries. Similar partnerships are 
developing in other industry sectors, relating to other social or environmental 
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problems. In 1996 WWF-International launched a partnership with Unilever 
Corporation, the worlds largest buyer of frozen fish, to create economic incentives 
within the seafood industry for sustainable fishing throughout the world. The new 
Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) is the result of their endeavours. The 
Fairtrade Foundation, a coalition of international development, consumer and fair 
trade organizations, has launched a pilot project to work with British companies to 
develop codes of practice to guide relationships with their Southern suppliers. 
These partnerships differ from previous collaborations based on corporate charity, 
as the NGOs are helping business with internal operational issues. NGOs are 
increasingly involved in the development of systems which imply civil regulation; 
these include multi-stakeholder agreed and independently verified codes of 
conduct for ethical business practice, such as the Forest Stewardship Council 
(FSC) system.  
 
With a variety of campaigning tools at their disposal, NGOsNorth and South
are creating a new politics of pressure to which business must respond. In her 
review of the state of the environment and human rights at the end of the 
millennium, Barbara Rose Johnston concludes that: 
 
Perhaps the strongest evidence of progressive political change is found in 
the informal civic organization sector, where the ability to organize, 
communicate, create networks, and form coalitions has meant the 
emergence of a political force whose power and impact cannot be 
overstated (1997:332). 
 
The emergence of this new political force demands more analysis so we might 
understand the true extent of its power and impact. A comparison with the 
characteristics of political movements in the past may throw some light on the 
subject. 
 
FROM PRODUCER POLITICS 
TO CONSUMER POLITICS 
 
It is widely understood that worker unrest with factory owners and other capitalists 
in most Northern industrialized countries at the turn of the last century led to the 
establishment and legal protection of trade unions and a democratic political force 
for workers. This was an incorporation of worker demands that served to head off 
the kind of revolutions against capitalism that occurred in some other countries. 
Critics of capitalism argued for the development of a producer politics where 
workers unite in order to control capitalist access to labour. The social 
democracies that emerged from this period embodied the notion that capitalism 
worked best if there was a counter-balancing force to capitalists through strong 
government and trade unions: capitalists needed the workers while workers, it was 
argued, needed the capitalists. 
 
This social democratic system has led to, or coincided with, a huge expansion of 
many economies during the twentieth century. At the close of the century the 
balance of forces embodied in this system has been lost. Governments pursuing 
neoliberal policies have largely rejected the social democratic model, rolling back 
the state both internally and externally by promoting international free trade. Trade 
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union power and influence have also declined. The result is that global business 
does not have an effective counter-balancing force of globally organized 
producers. Increasingly the offer of the lowest pay and working conditions wins 
the capitalist investment. 
 
Meanwhile in most Northern countries, work has changed. People are changing 
jobs more frequently than before. Family members no longer do what their parents 
did. Personal identity is not determined so much by ones work but increasingly by 
how one spends ones money and spare time. Thus the political issues of our time 
are leading to different outcomes. In Western industrialized countries, 
environmental concern has not led to workers uniting to demand better corporate 
performance, but consumers uniting to do so. Whereas the establishment of trade 
unions and powerful political parties incorporated the workers movement, the 
establishment of NGOs has incorporated the environmental movement. Usually 
supported by financial donations and voluntary labour, NGOs are the 
organizational expression of consumer politics. 
 
Whereas producer politics gained its power through controlling access to labour, 
consumer politics gains its power through controlling access to customers. 
Corporate boycotts and direct action protests are the confrontational outcomes of 
consumer politics, in contrast to the strikes and lock-outs of producer politics. 
Business-NGO partnerships are the co-operative tools of consumer politics, in 
contrast to the business-union deals of producer politics. Whether consumer 
politics can exert the same counter-balancing force as producer politics did in the 
past is still open to question. Business needs both workers and consumers. 
Consumers and workers both need business. The power of the worker resulted in a 
dialogue between employer and worker organizations. It seems that the power of 
the consumer will result in a dialogue between business and NGOs (consumer and 
environmental groups). 
 
The scope for genuine environmental dialogue comes down to power and 
influence. Certain groups of consumers (and their advocates) do not have the same 
power as other consumers. Consumer power is directly related to spending power. 
In consumer politics it is one dollar, one votenot one person, one vote. This 
poses major problems for people with little, or no, consumer power: citizens of 
Southern countries have far less of this political power than their counterparts in 
the North. At first sight, this suggests that there are fundamental constraints on the 
ability of consumer politicsand therefore civil regulationto ensure business 
responsibility for environmental protection in the South. 
 
However, in consumer politics, as with producer politics, we must remember that 
power is not gained by an individuals worth but through collective action and 
collective bargaining. Thus co-operation and camaraderie between civil society in 
the North (especially consumers) and in the South (including producers) may be 
able to deliver the necessary counter-balance to international business and create a 
favourable socio-economic environment for sustainable development. We return to 
this point later. 
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BEYOND LEGAL VERSUS SELF-COMPLIANCE 
 
In the face of increasingly powerful consumer politics in most Northern countries, 
many companies are beginning to introduce new environmental and social policies 
for their operations in Southern countries. These initiatives range from codes of 
conduct and certification schemes to purchasing policies and partnerships. As 
noted earlier, Shell has added support for human rights and sustainable 
development to its Statement of General Business Principles. BP is collaborating 
with a group of British development NGOs to improve its social and 
environmental performance in Colombia. Wood product retailers throughout 
Western Europe and North America are committing themselves to sourcing only 
from FSC-certified forests. Leading sporting goods companies are working to 
eliminate the use of child labour in the production of soccer balls in Pakistan. 
Many other examples of new corporate environmental and social policies affecting 
the South can be found in other industrial sectors, including chemicals, clothing 
and food production. 
 
Many would characterize these changes as evidence of the self-compliance 
agendaa second stage business response to sustainable development which is 
currently the dominant paradigm of environmental management. Self-compliance 
is championed as a way of promoting sustainable development by allowing 
flexibility in addressing environmental issues and by creating incentives for 
environmental innovations (WBCSD, 1997). However, self-compliance is 
criticized by both environmentalists and academics for not going far enough and 
for being used by industry as a means of discouraging new environmental 
legislation (Welford, 1997; FoE-UK, 1995). The United Nations Research Institute 
for Social Development (UNRISD) has also voiced these concerns, contending that 
international business cannot be expected to author their own regulation: this is 
the job of good governance (UNRISD, 1995:154 and 19). 
 
We do not believe that all the corporate environmental initiatives which are not 
demanded by governments are voluntary. Certainly, some of the impetus for the 
changes is coming from the business community itself, through organizations such 
as the WBCSD and the ICC. Key individuals within companies are also playing 
instrumental roles in the process of change. However, we believe it is the catalytic 
roles of Northern and Southern NGOs as business provocateurs and partners that 
are driving these changes. 
 
Northern NGOs are playing major roles in challenging the environmental and 
social impacts of Northern-based businesses operating in the South. Greenpeace 
International has been one of the leading NGOs in the worldwide campaign against 
Shells activities in Nigeria. Key Northern catalysts for public awareness about the 
destruction of tropical forests included the Rainforest Action Groups (RAGs) in 
the United Kingdom, United States and Australia, Friends of the Earth (FoE) 
groups in the United Kingdom and Netherlands, and numerous other grassroots 
campaign groups throughout Western Europe. On the partnership front, WWF-
International, with numerous national affiliates, has been the lead collaborator with 
business on forest-product certification and labelling. Likewise, SCF-UK and 
Oxfam-UK have been the first development NGOs to embrace partnership with 
sporting goods manufacturers and clothing retailers respectively. 
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The process of civilizing global corporations also depends upon the active 
participation of Southern NGOs. On both social and environmental fronts, 
Southern NGOs have raised global awareness through their activism and 
networking. Only when rainforest protests by Southern trade unions and NGOs 
encountered a violent backlash during the 1980s did the deforestation issue gain 
greater prominence in the international political arena. The recent work of the 
Tupinikim and Guarani and the subsequent media attention in Norway shows the 
power of Southern activists to transform local struggles for land rights and 
conservation in the South into tangible consumer and political issues in the North.  
 
Our argument is that these initiatives represent the emergence of a new form of 
regulation for international corporations, called civil regulation. Civil regulation 
occurs where organizations of civil society, such as NGOs, set the standards for 
business behaviour. Companies then chose to adopt or not to adopt these 
standards. For those that adopt the standards a number of commercial and non-
commercial benefits are available (credible marketing, staff motivation, etc.). For 
those companies that choose not to adopt these standards, the confrontational tools 
of consumer politics can be expected from civil society (boycotts, direct action, 
etc.), with deleterious effects on company sales, costs and social capital. Whereas 
government fines for pollution violations now rarely affect company value, 
consumer politics brings greater financial risks. Although governments may have 
the purported monopoly on forceand therefore the final sayin reality the 
ability of civil society organizations to regulate business behaviour through 
financial carrots and sticks is rapidly becoming more powerful.  
 
In our discussion of the politics of corporate environmentalism in part 1, our 
intention was to question the current stand-off between those who argue 
environmental management is a rational business response and those who argue it 
is only greenwash. In putting forward a theory of civil regulation, we aim to move 
the debate on effective corporate policy responses to sustainable development 
from the current self-compliance versus legal compliance divide to something 
more empowering. We believe that conceiving of corporate environmentalism as a 
political processand seeing the changing relations between businesses and 
NGOs as the emergence of civil regulationoffers new policy opportunities for 
businesses, NGOs and governments, which may vary depending on whether they 
are based in the industrialized North or less-industrialized South. In the following 
sections of this paper we turn to these policy options.  
 
THE CASE FOR CIVIL REGULATION 
 
The fact that partnerships between businesses and NGOs are increasing rapidly is 
evidence in itself that there are strong commercial and campaigning reasons for 
civil regulation. In the following section we describe some of the benefits and 
some of the problems for participating businesses and NGOs in both the North and 
South. 
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 The Corporate Rationale for Civil Regulation 
 
We believe there is a strong business case for welcoming the emergence of civil 
regulation. Many managers, campaigners or governmental officials following 
social and environmental issues in the world today would recognize that there is a 
global race to the bottom of environmental and social regulation. While 
profitability may rise in the short term as a result of lax regulation, this is not a 
stable social climate for business in the longer term. Civil unrest in the South can 
be understood as a reaction to the inadequacy of the state and to corporate 
malfeasance. 
 
Individual companies cannot respond to this emerging social and environmental 
crisis alone. To do so, for example by unilaterally pulling out of a gas development 
project in Peru, might affect investor confidence in the competitiveness of the 
company. If companies collaborate to improve environmental and social standards, 
they may succeed in creating a more favourable business climate in the long term. 
To achieve this, business requires an external force that can push reluctant 
companies forward. In the twenty-first century, it does not appear that 
governments will have sufficient capacity to play this role. Instead, inter-
governmental bodies and civil society organizations must take on greater 
responsibility for maintaining a level playing field. This is the business case for 
new global governance mechanisms, and consequently, civil regulation.  
 
Managers are beginning to recognize this need for an external force to drive all 
companies toward improved environmental and social management. For example, 
BPs Chris Marsden has said that if Greenpeace did not exist, BP would need to 
create itand that, overall, there is a major part to be played by NGOs, interest 
groups, local communities and public sector bodies in helping companies to make 
their best possible contribution to the well-being of society as well as to their 
shareholders (Marsden, 1997, personal communication). This help can take the 
form of protest or partnership.  
 
Given that the costs of confrontation are so high, especially when boycotts are 
involved, a number of companies are seeking constructive engagement with 
NGOs. There are many reasons why partnerships with NGOs are becoming an 
increasingly popular strategy for companies in the North. Understanding these 
reasons may give some indication of whether there will be new opportunities for 
partnership in the South. The reasons for working with Northern NGOs broadly 
relate to environmental public relations, eco-efficiency and organizational 
learning. We cover each in turn. 
 
For reasons of marketing, recruitment, employee motivation and risk management 
(preventing store boycotts and protecting share prices), it is prudent to cultivate the 
public impression of a socially and environmentally responsible business in a 
society with established consumer politics. The need for credibility is one factor. A 
recent study by the Investor Responsibility Research Centre (IRRC) for the Global 
Environmental Management Initiative (GEMI), Environmental Reporting and 
Third Party Statements, outlines how environmental reports and claims by 
companies continue to suffer from a credibility gap in the eyes of a variety of 
stakeholders (SustainAbility et al., 1996). Faced with this credibility challenge, 
active dialogue and stakeholder partnerships assume unprecedented importance 
(SustainAbility, 1996:21). 
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Northern retailers of products from Southern countries are particularly in need of 
credible information to reassure consumers. Credibility comes from independent 
standards and assessment. Government or NGO involvement is therefore required. 
The case study of retailers of tropical timber products presented in part 1 
illustrates this point clearly. Companies such as B&Q faced a crisis of credibility 
over their environmental performance as consumers became aware both of 
rainforest destruction and the early attempts at greenwash by a number of retailers. 
Both the British and Dutch governments were unable to provide suitable policy 
alternatives to empower retailers to respond to consumer concerns. 
 
By working with NGOs, some companies are generating a level of interest in their 
environmental policies which hitherto has only been experienced by the likes of 
the eco-conscious Body Shop. The experience of many companies in the WWF-
UK 1995 Group was that partnership with one NGO helped to reduce the attention 
of other NGOs. This has not been the experience of BP, which continues to face 
direct action from Greenpeace even while it engages development NGOs on other 
fronts. For the most part, however, collaboration with NGOs helps business to 
promote an environmentally responsible public image. 
 
In addition to these benefits there are the more non-political benefits which 
should not be overlooked. Financial and natural resource savingsor eco-
efficienciescan be achieved through partnership with NGOs. Companies in the 
1995 Group saved on expensive consultancy fees by working with WWF-UK. 
With complex supply chains and often strained buyer-supplier relations, the DIY 
retailers have benefited (and continue to benefit) greatly from WWF-UKs free 
advice in implementing their forest product sourcing and certification programmes. 
Similarly various sporting goods companies and their trade association, WFSGI, 
are learning from child welfare and labour standards experts with SCF-UK and 
ILO. Despite its ongoing problems with Greenpeace in the United Kingdom, BP is 
no doubt gaining a much needed critical perspective on its role in Colombia via the 
Interagency Group of British NGOs. 
 
The Shell case referred to earlier reminds us that huge TNCs with a variety of 
subsidiaries have a major internal governance challenge. Newly adopted or revised 
policies relating to environmental protection, stakeholder management and social 
capital will take time to be implemented at the operational level. The global 
network of NGOs may be able to help with introducing managers of subsidiaries to 
new ideas and ways of working.  
 
This brings us to another important benefit of partnership for participating 
companies, which relates to organizational learning. If profit-making organizations 
are to meet growing social and environmental demands, they will need to undergo 
profound organizational change. Corporate strategies need to consider fundamental 
questions such as who really needs this product? and will the community be 
healthy and prosperous enough to produce and to buy our products in the future? 
In order to address such concerns, business needs to work with other sectors of 
society. A collaborative approach to solving the social and environmental 
problems caused by business may be the most progressive and relevant 
organizational learning strategy of all. By embracing partnership strategies, 
business and NGOs have the potential to define the future of private enterprise. 
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For companies based in the South, the benefits of partnership and proactive 
support for civil regulation are less clear. Further research is needed on the 
potential benefits of working collaboratively with local community groups, 
national and international NGOs. In addition, research could focus on the success 
of privately owned companies as opposed to worker co-operatives founded upon 
partnership principles. In the absence of this research, we can only speculate on 
the potential benefits for Southern companies. 
 
First, there is a very real possibility that governments faced with illegal enterprise 
will license more foreign companies to exploit national resources. This is already 
happening in Latin America, where faced with illegal logging and mining 
governments are turning to international corporations to exploit resources and 
police the concessions licensed to them. The governments concerned anticipate 
that these corporations will have better environmental management policies than 
national companiesdue in part to pressure from Northern NGOs. Southern 
companies may, nevertheless, be better placed to understand local communities 
and to develop more appropriate sustainability management policies than their 
Northern counterparts. 
 
Second, growing numbers of Southern companies export to Northern countries. 
With increased market awareness in the North about the social and environmental 
performance of Southern suppliers, there are new commercial threats and 
opportunities. If Southern suppliers fail to adopt environmental management 
policies or to improve factory conditions, for example, they may lose major 
contracts. On the other hand, if Southern companies work with local and 
international NGOs on improving performance, they may secure longer term 
contracts and higher or more stable prices. 
 
Third, by collaborating with NGOs companies may be able to access new sources 
of finance. The recent commitment of the World Bank to lend millions of dollars 
to forestry companies that seek independent certification suggests that, in the 
future, sources of finance may be tied to demonstrable sustainable development 
management policies. Partnerships with civil society are one way of proving this 
commitment. 
 
Fourth, local communities have a lot to offer global and national business. Local 
resources, both human and natural, are essential ingredients in a long-term 
commercial strategy. Companies have much to gain by encouraging the active 
participation of local people as company employees, suppliers, sub-contractors, 
customers and other beneficiaries. Despite the limited development of consumer 
politics in the South, there are also considerable business benefits in maintaining 
good community relations. To earn a reputation as a good corporate citizen, 
companies are expected to provide financial and material assistance to community 
development projects. As the experience of Shell in Ogoniland aptly illustrates, 
poor corporate community relations can lead local people and activist groups to 
obstruct and sabotage business activities.  
 
It would be unwise to give the impression that the emergence of civil regulation 
provides only opportunities for the companies that respond positively. However, 
the business pitfalls with civil regulation are less easy to identify at present. The 
main problem for management in adopting a principle of complying with civil 
society is that it is difficult to know what the full implications may be. Business 
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may find itself restricted by the often commercially unaware nature of 
campaigning groups, as illustrated by certain companies frustration with the slow, 
cumbersome nature of the FSC decision-making process. Major soccer brands, 
such as Umbro and Mitre, and their Pakistani suppliers may eventually become 
impatient with the potentially bureaucratic nature of the monitoring and 
verification programme, particularly if it becomes too expensive and difficult to 
implement.  
 
One of the major problems facing business is that NGOs have widely different 
campaign strategies and priorities. As the impetus for civil regulation grows, there 
will no doubt be competing or contradictory schemes emerging from a growing list 
of potential NGO partners. Even if the end result is a long list of schemes on 
different themes, difficult choices lie ahead. In the future, Company X may find 
itself fully complying with Scheme A, while failing to making the grade on 
Scheme B. A related problem is that some civil regulation schemes may have 
uncompromising demands which would likely be incompatible with the 
commercial objectives of most companies. 
 
Even if a company manages to collaborate successfully with NGOs, it risks being 
undercut by other companies that are not pursuing the same management agenda. 
The benefits of civil regulation will only be realized if NGOs and activist groups 
are able to organize, obstruct and protest when a company fails to perform. In 
political systems where civil liberties are not ensured, companies can silence their 
critics and externalize more costs than companies pursuing civil regulation 
strategies. In practice, the same is often the case with regulation. Companies that 
choose to obey the law while other companies evade it may face a commercial 
disadvantage. In some contexts and countries, it makes better commercial sense to 
pay a small fine in order to realize a larger financial gain. However, in principle, 
legislation applies to all companies whereas civil regulation remains voluntary and 
seems unlikely to achieve universal commitment. 
 
 The NGO Rationale for Civil Regulation 
 
In outlining civil regulation as a new system of regulation, we do not mean to 
imply that there is a universal awareness of this system by campaigners working 
for NGOs with business-oriented campaigns. Unfortunately there is little 
appreciation of how the confrontational and collaborative campaigns of NGOs on 
a diverse set of single issues, North and South, are together providing a new 
context for international trade. With the increasing power and diversifying roles of 
NGOs, there is a need for campaigners to acknowledge the links between 
confrontation and collaboration, between environment and development and 
between North and South. 
 
Despite the rise of global NGO networks since the Earth Summit, there remains a 
surprising lack of understanding between the Northern environmental movement 
and local communities in the South. Many initiatives by Northern NGOs have been 
unable to overcome the environment-development or North-South divide. Northern 
conservation groups are still accused of ignoring indigenous peoples needs; one 
example of this is the establishment of national parks which have expelled people 
from their former homelands (Anderson and Grove, 1987). The FSC, for example, 
was founded with the aim of promoting socially beneficial forest management. 
Four years after its formation, however, membership by development NGOs and 
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trade unions is almost non-existent, with Northern environmental groups 
continuing to dominate. In addition, Southern representation has yet to exceed 25 
per cent of the total membership. Conversely, many Northern-based development 
NGOs, working on a variety of different issues and in different countries, have not 
yet fully integrated environmental issues into their work. 
 
The absence of a strong holistic vision for sustainable development by Northern 
NGOs may restrict their ability to pursue a comprehensive strategy for promoting 
greater corporate responsibility. This should be of particular concern for 
environmental groups in the North: 
 
Making the environmental movement something more than a dim 
reflection of developed country environmental concerns will only happen 
once the immediate impact of environmental degradation on peoples 
daily lives is addressed (Kaimowitz, 1996:31). 
 
For civil regulation to become a powerful progressive force for environmental 
sustainability and social justice, different NGOs pursuing different campaigning 
tactics must maintain their links. Those involved in business partnerships should 
seek transparency with the wider NGO movement. As noted in part 1, civil 
regulation requires confrontation as well as co-operation. Grassroots action will 
remain important in pushing business toward greater responsibility for 
environmental protection and social development. Protest is crucial for the 
empowerment of civil society, for stopping malpractice by alerting governments 
and citizens, and for reforming business toward sustainability by promoting the 
adoption of more effective environmental and social policies. 
 
Partnerships are also crucial for effective civil regulation, particularly where they 
lead to systems of multi-stakeholder agreed and independently verified codes of 
responsible business practice. This is how NGOs can help harness consumer 
support for environmental goals. Despite its many limitations, a more sustainable 
form of consumerism represents one way in which individuals can express their 
concern for the environment and promote positive change. By becoming involved 
in the development of consumer information systems and eco-labelling, we believe 
NGOs have the potential to restore consumer confidence in environmentally 
preferable products and hence the consumers sense of agency. This may help to 
politicize the market in favour of sustainability goals and ensure that consumer 
concern is translated into substantial social and environmental improvements. As 
noted earlier, NGOs can also play a validating role for voluntary initiatives, 
thereby lending them added credibility and the necessary bite to deliver more 
substantial change in business behaviour. 
 
Dialogue and partnership with business is also a catalyst for the greater 
environmental education of society. Business managers, who may have never 
previously engaged constructively with sustainability issues, are now doing so. 
Given their global reach and commercial power, many corporations can reach far 
more people than an individual NGO. By promoting their environmental policies 
to customers and staff, many people are learning more about the role of business in 
solving environmental and social problems. In addition, the demonstration of 
workable partnership solutions can be an effective means of encouraging 
governments to pursue innovative policy alternatives. This need for new models is 
essential given the apparent reluctance and/or inability of governments to 
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introduce new and stronger environmental laws or to ensure compliance with 
existing legislation. 
 
Business-NGO partnerships concerned with core business practices are a new 
phenomenon, one with which most NGOs are unfamiliar. Partnerships with 
business thus present a number of strategic problems for NGOs. In the various 
forest-related partnerships outlined earlier, almost no attempt has been made to 
develop systems to evaluate the partnerships direct contribution to the 
achievement of specific environmental goals. Today the main quantitative analyses 
of an NGOs success are based upon membership levels and the extent of media 
coverage. Third-wave environmentalists need new ways to judge performance. 
Indicators such as the percentage reduction in waste per dollar spent, or the 
acres of forest saved per dollar invested are required if we are to truly know the 
full costs and benefits of business partnerships for participating NGOs.  
 
Some of these concerns appear to be addressed within other initiatives. Although it 
is too early to evaluate the Pakistan soccer ball partnership, the projects plans 
include both monitoring and verification of industry compliance and a wide range 
of social protection activities for children, their families and local communities. 
SCF-UK appears to have been instrumental in ensuring that the project will not 
just phase out child labour, but that it will meet important social development 
needs as well. 
 
This leads to another concern with business-NGO partnerships: the opportunity 
costs. With an increasing amount of time and finance spent on working with 
business, other means of achieving environmental and social goals, such as 
litigation or strengthening government capacity, may be compromised. In addition, 
media work may focus increasingly on the general publics role as green or ethical 
consumers rather than on citizens committed to conservation, social justice and 
sustainable communities. 
 
Then there is the question of independence. NGOs run the risk of being co-opted 
by business, which seeks to improve its image by selling certified and labelled 
products endorsed, directly or indirectly, by an NGO. There is a concern that 
single-issue partnerships may prevent an NGO from publicly criticizing its 
business partner on other social or environmental matters. In the case study on the 
sporting goods industry described above, SCF-UK rejected invitations by the 
industry to become involved in a labelling scheme, because it did not want to 
endorse a companys child-free soccer balls while the same company continued to 
sell other unethical products. This example reflects a widely held belief on the part 
of many NGOs and activists that tools such as certification and labelling are too 
incremental and fail to address the underlying causes of social injustice and 
environmental degradation. 
52 
UNRISD Discussion Paper No. 109 
THE POTENTIAL OF CIVIL REGULATION 
FOR THE SOUTH 
 
Much of the evidence provided for the emergence of civil regulation as a driver of 
corporate responsibility for environmental protection in the South involves 
Northern NGOs and transnational business. Although many of the corporate 
responses to environmental issues have occurred as a result of protest by groups 
and communities in the South, the role of Northern NGOs in facilitating civil 
regulation has been key. We have argued that in most cases it is consumer politics 
in Northern industrialized markets that compels companies to take action. 
Therefore one must question the potential for civil regulation to be replicated in 
different countries, particularly for businesses involved in domestic or 
international trade where the market does not feature well-developed consumer 
politics.  
 
There are some signs that consumer politics is beginning to penetrate parts of the 
non-Western world. A joint Chile/Japan project to educate Japanese consumers on 
the problems with the woodchip trade is one example. Another is the growth of 
national eco-labelling schemes in Taiwan, Japan and South Korea. These examples 
suggest that some progress is being made in building consumer and corporate 
awareness in these key markets.  
 
However, there is much evidence to the contrary. In the case of forestry, Northern 
business support for the FSC has not stopped Asian companies with poor 
management practices from increasing their logging activities in tropical forests. 
The growing demand for timber in the emerging economies does not appear to be 
matched by growing consumer politics. Even as Northern-based companies in 
other sectors develop higher social and environmental standards for their 
operations in the South, their Asian or Latin American competitors are likely to 
continue to cut corners when supplying Southern markets. This means that civil 
regulation, as expressed through certification and labelling schemes, may merely 
serve to shift international trading patterns and have little affect on environmental 
protection or sustainable development in the South. 
 
Despite the limited extent of consumer politics, Southern NGOs are beginning to 
become involved directly in civil regulation schemes (rather than contributing to 
Northern NGO-administered civil regulation through protest and conflict). The 
case of Shell approaching the Peruvian NGO RAP to monitor its operations in the 
Camisea region suggests that the civil regulation model is beginning to emerge in 
the South. At the same time, however, many other NGOs, activist groups and 
indigenous peoples organizations continue to challenge Shells activities in 
Nigeria and Peru. More research is needed on the capacity and desire of Southern 
NGOs to take on such monitoring roles. 
 
More research on the business response to citizen action in South is also necessary. 
Charles Reillys review of Latin American NGOs notes complex sets of national 
and international relationships but offers no examples of formal business-NGO 
collaboration (1995:248). However, Brian Loveman suggests that 
environmentally-focused NGOs in Chile are more likely to make demands upon 
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government and nongovernmental actors (e.g. business) as a lobby . . . or interest 
group (1995:126). 
 
Throughout much of the South, many differences still remain between the 
commitment and capacity of national versus global business on environmental 
matters. A 1995 survey on public perceptions of economic reforms conducted by 
the Consumer Unity and Trust Society in India and Nepal came across a universal 
opinion, not withstanding Bhopal, that TNCs are better at environmental 
management than domestic entrepreneurs, because of their track record and 
circumstances at home (Mehta, 1997, personal communication). 
 
This seems logical, given our argument that much of the impetus for corporate 
environmentalism comes from the growing strength of civil society and consumer 
politics in the North. Where there is limited demand for environmental 
responsibility in the home nation, companies are more likely to continue to behave 
irresponsibly. It could be said that the forest communities of Papua New Guinea 
and other South Pacific countries are suffering the consequences of limited 
environmental awareness and consumer politics in Malaysia, Indonesia and Japan. 
 
Meanwhile, most Southern NGOs continue to have little or no experience of co-
operative relations with big business, either national or global. There is also little 
evidence in the literature of Southern business embracing civil society as allies. 
Mutual prejudices will take time to overcome. Co-Chair for civil society on the 
Philippine Council for Sustainable Development, Nicanor Perlas, explains that: 
 
The thawing of the lines between business and civil society is fairly 
recent. Bridges are still being built. Trust is still being developed. 
Common policy agendas are still being nurtured. It may be some time 
before actual partnerships emerge (Perlas, 1997, personal 
communication). 
 
In a similar vein, Miguel D. de Oliveira and Rajesh Tandon believe that: in the 
countries of the South, NGOs . . . have so far had little contact with the emerging 
initiatives of corporate philanthropy (1994:3). As and when Southern businesses 
expand their efforts in the areas of corporate community involvement and 
environmental protection, Southern NGOs and base groups may find themselves in 
the company of new partners. 
 
In addition to developing collaborative relations with industry, to be effective, civil 
society needs to perform a watchdog role competently. However, the ability to 
organize, take direct action and speak loudly and freely is often not protected by 
government. In many countries, governments actively undermine NGO efforts to 
take on these roles: 
 
The recent murders of green activists in Honduras, Columbia and even 
Costa Rica (a country which prides itself on its environmental awareness) 
are reminders that environmental campaigns can strike at the heart of 
political and corporate power (Collinson, 1996:1). 
 
Without the ability to wield the stick, Southern NGOs and communities will not 
be able to realize the benefits of civil regulation. Helen Collinson argues that the 
main failure here is government inability or unwillingness to exercise responsible 
force: 
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One reason why Latin American environmental campaigners are more 
vulnerable than their fellow activists in Europe or North America is that 
Latin Americas democratic and judicial institutions are still weak and 
protesters often have limited recourse to the law (1996:1). 
 
This reminds us that NGOs do not have the same power as governments, as they 
do not have a universal monopoly on the use of force. They do not have the ability 
to impose fines or other penalties. The power of NGOs lies in the use of the 
marketplace to boycott a companys products, or affect its staff morale or investor 
confidence. This market power is usually limited to societies with well-organized 
consumer politics. It also depends on the ability of NGOs to communicate their 
message effectively to consumers, and this usually requires substantial resources. 
Where NGOs do not have sufficient financial and communications resources, they 
may be constrained in their capacity to use the stick of consumer boycotts or 
mobilizing dissent. This may not be only a matter of limited access to information 
technology. Unlike many large Northern NGOs, most Southern NGOs do not have 
the in-house public relations capacity to challenge slick corporate PR campaigns
such as Burson-Marstellers recent efforts to undermine the indigenous peoples 
campaign against Aracruz Cellulose. 
 
It appears, then, that for Southern NGOs to become active in civil regulation they 
need to be linked with supportive NGOs in countries with developed consumer 
politics. The Shell Nigeria example also reminds us that Southern campaigning on 
its own is not always effective in changing corporate practices. Protests by local 
Delta communities against the operations of Shell began in the late 1980s. Shells 
responsibility for the plight of the Ogoni became an issue for consumer politics in 
the North much later. Global civil society alliances backed up by activist 
companies and an attentive media are also key determinants of effective NGO 
campaigning and civil regulation. 
 
The need for North-South alliances between NGOs is an indication of the 
democratic deficit Southern civil society currently faces with civil regulation 
mechanisms. The cases examined in part 1 demonstrate that the power to regulate 
corporate activity in the South resides in the North. To influence the behaviour of 
global corporations or their subsidiaries, Southern civil society must make contact 
with Northern civil society and then persuade them of their grievances and their 
alternatives. Many Southern NGO campaigners argue that Northern NGOs impose 
solutions on them, demonstrating an approach which could be described as ethical 
imperialism. In order to overcome this problem, Southern NGO participation in 
policy development must be facilitated. This poses a logistical and financial 
challenge that many Northern NGOs appear reluctant to meet. However, as the 
civil regulation agenda develops, more questions will be asked of Northern NGOs 
relating to their legitimacy in negotiating on behalf of developing country 
communities: unlike pandas and whales, people can speak for themselves. 
Therefore NGOs seeking greater legitimacy for collaborative business campaigns 
will require greater Southern civil society input in the future. 
 
Despite the many concerns about the limits of civil regulation outlined above, this 
new policy instrument holds some promise for reducing the social and ecological 
footprint of Northern economies on the rest of the world. Other complementary 
measures will no doubt be needed to regulate companies in the future, particularly 
those based in the South. Although many political battles may lie ahead, 
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particularly in multilateral bodies such as the WTO, the ILO and the United 
Nations Commission on Sustainable Development, there is growing recognition of 
the need for a wider range of regulatory tools to monitor corporate performance on 
social and environmental matters. 
 
GOVERNMENTAL POLICY FRAMEWORKS 
FOR CIVIL REGULATION 
 
As mentioned earlier, governments are finding it difficult to provide a regulatory 
function in a global economy. The declining desire and capacity of the state to 
regulate, police and enforce is illustrated well in the case of deforestation. Against 
a history of land disputes and illegal logging, in 1997 both the Brazilian and 
Venezuelan governments announced that they would privatize forests in order to 
conserve them. The assumption is that major international corporations have 
greater resources than governments to police forest management in their 
concessions. There are concerns that the governments may not be able to regulate 
such companies effectively. It seems likely that the regulatory power of NGOs 
will be required to ensure that forests are not being managed irresponsibly.  
 
In this section of the paper, we consider the role of governments in civil regulation 
and the need for supportive policy frameworks at the national and international 
levels. 
 
 Government as Facilitator 
 
There is a range of opinion on the role of government in promoting greater 
business responsibility for environmental protection in the South. As the role of 
NGOs in greening business is closely related to the inability of governments to 
regulate effectively on environmental and social matters, a number of NGOs may 
be tempted to ignore what government has to offer. The go-it-alone attitude can be 
found in the new fourth generation NGO strategies, which include a focus on 
building capacity in the NGO sector for facilitating sustainable development 
(Korten, 1990). The broad NGO coalition now arguing against an international 
forest convention for reasons roughly summarized as it would be a distraction, is 
one example of this new thinking in civil society. Many of their partners in 
industry believe that the role of legislation is a limited one and that market-based 
mechanisms should prevail. However, a number of managers of companies 
involved in business-NGO partnerships do not believe that partnerships and 
voluntary initiatives should replace flexible and efficient legislation. 
 
We believe that governments and inter-governmental bodies should actively 
promote global social and environmental responsibility in the business sector. To 
begin with, governments could support the ability of their citizens to promote civil 
regulation. This could be achieved by strengthening civil society through 
protecting the ability of people to organize, to speak freely, to protest and to 
suggest alternatives. Much of the violence against those campaigning for land 
rights or against particular development projects can be linked to the activities of 
companies or entrepreneurs. Many governments are equally culpable in the 
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repression of environmental and social activists in the South: the violence of the 
Nigerian regime against the Ogoni is one example. 
 
The problem appears to be that governments are seeking economic development in 
very narrow terms. The big and modern is valued more than the small and 
appropriate. The environment is seen as something to be dominated rather than 
worked with. Consequently, environmental issues are seen as a barrier to economic 
progress, a view which can be challenged on many fronts.  
 
A fresh approach would see governments recognizing environmental challenges as 
opportunities for economic success. Given the growing power of civil society in 
the North, there are increasing opportunities for Southern governments to lever 
new funds to help exporters access new markets, and to work in partnership with 
foreign companies to promote cost-effective resource management. Southern 
entrepreneurs that recognize the social and environmental demands of Northern 
markets and adjust their strategies accordingly may be able to achieve greater 
success. Governments can support such efforts by obtaining additional financial 
resources for commercial projects that support sustainable development. One 
example is the partnership between WWF-International and the World Bank, 
which aims to provide millions of dollars of credit for timber projects that are 
independently certified as well-managed.  
 
Southern governments could also assist their national companies to access new 
markets. There is a widely held belief that the Northern green consumer is only a 
niche market. However, green consumerism is not dictating the size of the green 
market. Instead it is the buying power of corporations, adjusting to the pressures 
and opportunities of consumer politics, that provides the real opportunity. For 
example, about 25 per cent of the British and 50 per cent of the Dutch timber 
markets are not niche markets. To help Cameroonian companies supply these 
growing markets, the Cameroon Ministry of Forestry recently began working with 
the European Commission and environmental NGOs.  
 
Furthermore, governments could work in partnership with foreign companies to 
promote cost-effective resource management. Faced with huge costs to enforce 
environmental regulations in remote areas, granting natural resource concessions 
to companies that meet independently monitored environmental and social 
standards could prove an effective tool for sustainable development. Currently this 
strategy is being frowned upon by many campaigners and commentators. However, 
if the standards used were to be developed in consultation with a variety of 
stakeholders, including local communities, then this strategy might be widely 
welcomed. New systems of globally applicable, multi-stakeholder negotiated and 
independently monitored environmental, social or ethical standards for business 
offer Southern governments new economic opportunities and regulatory 
mechanisms. 
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 Toward Global Private Regulation 
 
The FSC is perhaps the best current model of a civil regulation organization. It sets 
global multi-stakeholder standards for forest management, based on a democratic 
decision-making process. Compliance with these civil standards is then 
independently monitored, which is similar to the way compliance with legal 
standards is measured. One of the possible problems with this model is that the 
business pays the civil regulation bills. This could compromise the independence 
of the regulator. To combat this, accreditation is used. The actual monitoring and 
certification is performed by companies or organizations (certification bodies) who 
are paid for the regulatory service. These certification bodies are then accredited 
by the FSC to ensure that they uphold the standards and criteria of the FSC. 
Whereas the certification bodies might be vulnerable to compromised 
independence, the accreditation process ensures the credibility of the system.  
 
The standard-setting process is paid for by donations from governments, 
companies, trust funds and so forth. Companies pay for the actual certifications, 
and eventually pass on the costs to the end consumer. In this way, companies or 
individuals pay for the regulation of a particular product when they buy that 
product. Independent certification of business against multi-stakeholder defined 
sustainability standards represents a privatization of the regulatory function of 
government, while protecting the democratic participation of citizens. We believe 
that this system could become the new regulatory framework for business in a 
global economy. We call it global private regulation.  
 
 Other Policy Options and Obstacles 
 
As we mentioned above, Southern governments have the opportunity to invite 
global corporations to invest, with the proviso that their operations are 
independently certified against standards set by a variety of national and 
international stakeholders. For the government this is free regulation; and it offers 
the potential for international trade to promote sustainable and equitable future 
incomes. Northern governments should also promote this process, as it allows for 
further politicization of the market and therefore the effective translation of 
consumer politics into beneficial social change.  
 
However, the option of developing countries welcoming foreign direct investment 
(FDI) on the condition that it meets civil regulation standards appears threatened 
by the possibility of a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), of the type 
which was being drafted within the OECD until negotiations broke down in 
October 1998. It aimed at smoothing the international rules governing foreign 
direct investment. As we described earlier, FDI is now a critical determinant in 
development. Many NGOs were concerned that the OECD initiative would rule 
against the use of environmental conditions on FDI (Coates, 1997, personal 
communication). Other analysts believe that an investment agreement could, in 
principle, strengthen the ability of governments to place environmental conditions 
on FDI, and even propose a code of conduct for companies investing in developing 
countries (Esty and Gentry, 1997). Developing countries that sign such an 
agreement in order to attract greater inward investment may therefore be prevented 
from facilitating sustainable development through a fresh approach of partnership 
with business and civil society. Our hope is that if a global investment agreement 
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is eventually negotiated, it should contain an exemption so that signatory 
governments can require investing companies to meet globally recognized 
environmental and social standards.  
 
The concern with how the MAI would affect government policies for sustainable 
development reminds us of the importance of intergovernmental agreements. No 
matter how effective corporate environmentalism, civil regulation or global private 
regulation could prove to be, international co-operation and mechanisms of global 
governance are urgently required. United Nations agencies could provide these 
mechanisms. The Pakistan case referred to in part 1 suggests a new activist role for 
United Nations agencies in the area of civil regulation. A revitalized UNEP may be 
able to assume the kind of monitoring and verification role currently being 
undertaken by the ILO in the Pakistan child labour project. As part of the United 
Nations Secretary-Generals plans for reform, there is promise of future action to 
develop new measures to reorganize and strengthen UNEP. Kofi Annan wants 
UNEP to re-affirm its role as the environmental agency of the world community 
and promises to ensure that it has the status, strength and access to resources 
needed to fulfil this task (Cohen, 1997, personal communication). In Annans 
words: Without good governancewithout the rule of law, predictable 
administration, legitimate power, and responsive regulationno amount of 
funding, no amount of charity will set us on the path to prosperity (Annan, 1997). 
 
Although we have argued that both government and intergovernmental agencies do 
have a role to play in a changed global economy, this role is not widely 
recognized. At the same time, the role of consumer politics, civil regulation and 
global private regulation in facilitating the contribution of the business sector to 
sustainable development is largely overlooked. Companies and governments are 
wary of NGOs, while activists remain wary of managing directors and politicians. 
Many Southern government ministers see calls for the inclusion of environmental 
or labour standards in trade and investment agreements as attempts at 
protectionism by Northern countries, rather than as opportunities for sustainable 
development. Negotiation toward a free trade area of the Americas is one example, 
where trade ministers of certain Latin American countries have stalled attempts by 
Costa Rica to discuss environmental standards and trade. Southern ministers still 
view weak environmental and social standards as a competitive advantage. Until 
this changes, the potential for civil regulation in the South will not be realized. 
One country that is seeking the opportunities afforded by sustainable development 
is the Philippines: 
 
Philippine Agenda 21 [PA21] is the countrys blueprint for sustainable 
development. It holds great promise for another development. PA21 
clearly defines the parameters for the involvement of FDI in the 
Philippine economy. The Philippines has realized, at least some segments 
of the Philippine bureaucracy, that if it does not clearly define its own 
vision, it will be defined from the outside by ODA and FDI. The real test 
will come when we clearly specify . . . investment parameters connected 
to productivity, profitability, equity and sustainability, among others. 
Then we will see if FDI will be willing to work under these new 
parameters, and not simply flow where the labor is cheap, or the resources 
plentiful and unregulated (Perlas, 1997, personal communication). 
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The behaviour of FDI in the Philippines over the coming years will indicate 
whether corporate environmentalism extends to accepting the will of the people
and acting on it. 
 
 Conclusion 
 
In part 2 of this paper, we have argued that: 
 
 corporate environmentalism is a political phenomenon; 
 through the politics of both pressure and engagement, NGOs are creating the 
new agenda for business, as much as companies are themselves; 
 the political power of NGOs is not a passing fad but an expression of a new 
form of consumer politics which is the result of social, economic and cultural 
change; 
 by describing a continuum of protest and partnership relations between 
business and NGOs we can observe a new form of regulation for global 
business, called civil regulation; 
 civil regulation organizations, like the FSC and MSC, will probably be 
replicated in other industrial sectors and come to be known as systems of global 
private regulation; 
 these developments rely on the sensitivities of Northern markets, thereby 
limiting the extent of their impact on the developing world; 
 changes in the global economy mean that governments need to assume a greater 
role as leaders and facilitators, but they are in danger of negotiating that role 
away through trade and investment agreements such as the MAI; 
 the uncertainty that surrounds the issue of corporate environmentalism suggests 
the need for greater international collaboration in this area. 
 
This paper has explored the potential and limits of business-NGO partnership and 
civil regulation as new tools to promote corporate responsibility for sustainable 
development. At the close of the twentieth century, the jury is still out on the role 
of such initiativesand indeed of business itselfin the sustainable development 
process. It could even be said that the jury is still hearing the evidence for and 
against. Those who wish to prosecute business can present a catalogue of 
environmental disasters, human rights abuses, worker health and safety violations, 
etc. Those who wish to defend the role of partnership can present a growing array 
of policy statements, environmental and social projects, civil regulation schemes 
and other fledgling initiatives. What this paper shows is that we cannot deliver a 
verdict at this time, and there is a need to collect more evidence for a fair trial. 
Eventually we may find that business and partnership should not be the only 
ones on trial but instead a cadre of company managers, government officials, 
United Nations experts, NGO campaigners, voters and consumers, who 
individually and collectively could be doing much more to promote a more 
sustainable and equitable future. 
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